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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to study how and why news framing shift from the 
routine mode to the crisis mode by examining Hong Kong's press coverage of the 
Beijing pro-democracy movement in 1989. It is found that the imtial news frames 
vary with the press，political ideologies spanning from the left to the right. As 
the crisis unfolded, all the newspapers converged in showing their support for the 
students and their opposition to the Chinese Government. However, when the 
Beijing authorities regained control, the newspapers began reverting to their 
original positions. 
This crisis is characterized by a high degree of power uncertainty 
as well as heavy social involvement. Hiese are conducive to the relaxation of 
organizational control over journalists which, when coupled with the journalists， 
personal involvement, in effect render journalists' personal inclination the 
dominating factor in news framing. Once the crisis is over, organizational control 
is resumed and personal tendencies are again suppressed. That explains how 
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As a journalist，I will never forget the experience of reporting the 
Tiananmen Square tragedy in 1989. The excitement, the involvement, the sense 
of achievement in beating the news blackout and the depression in witnessing the 
massacre were all beyond compare. 
As a graduate student of mass communication, however, the tragedy 
interests me in another way. Studies have found newspapers in Hong Kong to be 
framing major political events in totally different ways according to their 
background (Chan and Lee 1984，Lee 1987). Yet, it was certainly not the case 
this time. In a surprising move, the leftist press took an anti-Beijing stand. Hie 
commercial press also gave up their moderate posture towards the Chinese 
government. Both of them had joined the rightist Hong Kong Times in 
condemning and de-legitimizing the Chinese government in their news reports. 
What interests me more is that as soon as the situation was 
stabilized, the newspapers became ‘normal，again. Differences in news framing 
between different types of newspapers recurred. All these led me to the decision 
to study how and why news framing shifts from the routine mode to the crisis 
mode and then back again. 
A search through the literature revealed that little had been done 
in this field. However, basing on researches on news framing in routine times and 
organizational behaviour in crises, I was able to put forward a set of assumptions 
to be tested. Hie portrayal of the Tiananmen Square incident by the Hong Kong 
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organizational behaviour in crises, a set of assumptions are generated. A number 
of studies have confirmed that, during routine situations, the interest of the news 
organization is a major factor in determining news frames. The personal interests 
and inclinations of the journalists, on the other hand, is always suppressed. In a 
crisis，however, the situation will be quite different. It is hypothesised that (1) 
during a crisis, due to the uncertainties of the situation, the organizational control 
on journalists will be loosened; (2) the strong personal involvement of journalists 
will turn them into advocates rather than gatekeepers and (3) as a result, the 
personal interest of journalists will become more important in news framing in 
a crisis. 
Hie portrayal of the Tiananmen Square incident by the Hong Kong 
press provides a good case for testing these hypotheses. The Hong Kong press 
was operating in the routine mode during the first stage of the student movement 
when the political and social situation in both China and Hong Kong was still 
relatively stable. Following the sharp confrontation between the students and the 
government, the press gradually entered the crisis mode. Hien the routine mode 
made a comeback after the situation was stabilized. Analyzing how the same 
incident was framed by the press in different stages will give us a clear picture 
of how and why news framing is different between the routine mode and the 
crisis mode. 
This thesis is organized into eleven chapters. After these opening 
words in Chapter One, I shall go on to review the literature on the framing of 
news in the next chapter. 
A model of news framing in crisis will be put forward in Chapter 
Three. 
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IT e^ press structure of Hong Kong will be introduced in Chapter 
Four, followed by methodology and hypotheses of this study. 
-From Chapter Six to Chapter Ten, I shall illustrate how the 
Tiananmen Square incident was framed by the Hong Kong press in different 
stages and the factors involved. 




2.1 The Concept of News Frames 
"Objective reporting" has become a doctrine in western journalism 
since the end of World War I (Schudson 1978). Most people believed that news 
should be identical with "facts" and insulated from "values". However, following 
numerous studies in recent years, the myth of absolute objectivity in news 
reporting has lost ground. Instead of being a mirror reflecting the "reality"，news 
is now rather seen as "the active, patterned remaking performed by mirrors in 
a fun house." (Gitlin 1980). Or，in Tuchman's words, the reality is constructed 
rather than impartially reflected in news (Tuchman 1978). “ 
In the last fifteen years or so, a number of different studies have 
come to the same conclusion: there is a set or sets of rules, either recognized or 
unrecognized，which governs the daily work of journalists, enabling them to 
decide，among the infinite number of eveiyday occurrences, what and how to 
report. These rules are labelled with different names. Some call it "news or 
細mai i s tk paradigms" (e.g Chan and U e 1984; Chan 1987; Bennett, Gressett 
and Haltom 1985). Others call it "news perspectives". (Altheide 1976; Gans 1979) 
It is also referred to as ” media logic ” (Altheide and Snow 1979) or "media 
frames', (Tuchman 1978，Gitlin,1980). 
Although these terms are used to illustrate similar concepts, they 
. l i a v e different emphases. For example, paradigms, denned as "gestalt worldviews" 
(Chan and Lee 1984) are more conceptual and encompassing. H^e concern of 
JL 
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news frames, on the other hand, refers more to the daily operation level and is 
more event-oriented. The latter can be regarded as a subset of the former. As 
this study is designed to trace the media portrayal of a social crisis but not so 
imich journalistic paradigms as a whole, the concept of news frames would be 
more appropriate. 
"Frame" was originally used by Ervin Goffinan (1974) to refer to the 
principles by which one organizes eveiyday experience. Hie concept was later 
applied by Gaye Tuchman (1978) and Todd Gitlin (1980) in news analysis. Gitlin 
defines news frames as "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and 
presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers 
routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual" (Gitlin 1980). In other 
words，news frames not only decide what aspects of a certain occurrence should 
become news; they also decide how journalists, and，in turn, the audience, should 
make sense out of these occurrences. A civil protest can be framed as either a 
"disturbance" or a "campaign to fight for justice" (GitHn 1980). A murder case 
can be interpreted as either a crime or an ideological issue (Gerbner 1964). 
There are a lot more examples which suggest that the meaning and presentation 
of a news event will differ when framed in different ways. 
2，:2 The Formation of News Frames 
As what has been well established in the field of sociology and 
psychology，people with different expectations, backgrounds and in different 
positions perceive events differently. Hiere is no exception in the field of 
journalism. 
• All journalists are mix-role social beings while performing their 
professional duties. They are at the same time employees of a news organization, 
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members of the profession of journalism and well educated grown up citizens in 
the society, each having one's own personal background and experience. Their 
interpretations of the world are, therefore, unavoidably influenced by at least 
three sets of interests: (1) the organizational interest, (2) the professional interest 
and (3) the personal interest. Furthermore, the meaning of an event is also 
determined by the background against which it is perceived. In newsmaking, 
therefore，the social context is also a major factor determining the significance 
of different events. 
人 Organizational Interests: Political vs Commercial 
Hie interest of news organizations has been cited as the major factor 
affecting the framing of news in a number of studies (e.g Gerbner, 1964; Chan 
and Lee, 1984; Lee, 1987). The interest of news organizations, in turn, are mainly 
determined by their primary goals. 
There are two major types of news organizations in terms of their 
primary goal: the advocate press and the commercial press. Hie foois of news 
interpretation is totally different between the two. 
The term "advocate press" refers to all newspapers which explicitly 
promote a particular set of ideas. It includes "partisan newspapers" which 
explicitly and firmly advocate particular political ideologies, and newspapers run 
by different interest groups. For the advocate press, every news story must first 
be politically filtered to find out whether it is related to the interest of the . 
newspapers. If it is, the story will be bounded within a political frame and be 
. interpreted according to its ideology. 
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Gerbner (1964) iUustrates how newspapers with different political stances 
differ in reporting a murder case. He finds that the political press tries to explain 
the case in a cultural context while commercial papers tend to play down its 
political implications. Chan and Lee (1984) also single out political ideology of 
news organizations as the major variable in the formation of "journalistic 
paradigms" in Hong Kong.‘ 
Commercial newspapers, on the other hand, apply totally different 
logic. Their primary concern is to compete with other newspapers and make 
revenue, just like what other entertainment media do (ffirsh 1977). Hierefore， 
their choices and presentations of news are mainly audience-oriented. Hiey select 
and handle stories in a way that readers will be "interested". "Boring" stories are 
either avoided or downplayed. 
Commercial newspapers with different target readers also frame 
stories with different emphases. Rosenthal (1978) finds that newspapers with a 
large circulation tend to frame riot news with a "problem-solving" approach。 
Newspapers identifying themselves with lower-middle class communities are found 
to take riots as something unavoidable. 
Although the "advocate" press and the "commercial press" frequently 
go on separate ways in framing news, their interest may change with time and 
types of story. A study of Hong Kong newspapers find that even the party press 
sometimes put on the " economic lens" when handling stories that are perceived . 
； 徴 = 二 r p 二 ― 二 怎 微 
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as having no political significance (Lee 1987). ^  For the commercial press, on the 
other hand, not all types of stories are found to be revenue-oriented (TunstaU 
1971).3 
B. Professional Interests 
Apart from organizational interests, the interpretation of news is 
also shaped by the professional interests of journalists. Their interests as 
professionals are determined by their self-perceived role as joumaHsts-
something which they expect themselves to achieve as a member of the 
profession. 
Tliere are two major models of journalism: the gatekeepers and the 
advocates. Hie gatekeepers see themselves as "public servants", whose major roie 
is to ,’ detect, emphasize and disseminate" "important information" to the public 
as a whole. Individual members of the public havte to make sense out of the 
news by themselves according to their own interests. Hie advocates, on the other 
hand，see themselves as "lawyers，’ representing the interests of certain groups in 
the public. It is the interests of the "client group", rather than the whole public, 
that is taken care of in news reporting (Janowitz, 1975). 
Different professional interests produce different frames on news 
events. A labour dispute may be interpreted by the "gatekeepers" in terms of the 
inconvenience it causes to the public，as they feel that is what the public ( as a 
of in I^eng Kong ^ e keen at promoting the political interest 
stories. A assist^t chief ei tor of Z Z T p T ^ U o r l t ^ ^ handling non-political 
Communist Party, remarked " for nn^nnlfff.^ 細 K o n g newspaper directly financed by the Chinese 
interest•“ ( Lee m 7 : 7 3 ) nonpoiitical issues, we pay more attention to marketing and reader,s 
• used； t t c T e S ^ r S i S ^ ： t ； "站 a va f^ le . Most researchers 
appropriate, however, to use one sindrfactor ta Z Z l ^ ^^ news frames. It may not be 
For exampl；, the coi^mercLTres^s n t ne/p 巧 1。completely different type ofnewsmaking logic, 
political i ‘ — = o \ a 二 〜 n o 二 ^ ^ ^ ^ of the poHtical scale. Therefo're, fhe 
press. e oinerence between the commercial press and the political 
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whole) is most concerned about. But for advocate journalists who are interested 
in labour welfare, this may be a story that illustrates the injustice in the labour 
laws. Tlie same story will be presented quite differently because of different 
interpretations by two groups of journalists. 
Even followers of the same professional model might have different 
professional expectations. Johnstone, Slawski and Bowman (1972) surveyed the 
American journalists in the early 70s. Their study was replicated by Weaver and 
Wilhoit (1986) twelve years later. Both studies report that journalists in the 
United States view the ’’ extremely important mass media role" differently among 
themselves. Hie self-perceived role of journalists are bound to affect their 
perception of news events. For instance, both the Johnstone and Weaver studies 
how that a considerable number of American journalists (76% and 66% 
respectively) agree that,, investigating government claims', as the most important 
professional task. For these journalists, special attention 腿st be paid to detect 
and play up possible frauds of the government in the stories they cover. 
C. Personal Interests 
Unlike "organizational interests" and "professional interests", the 
significance of journalists' "personal interests" as a factor of news framing has not 
drawn 腿cli attention. White's classic study of “ Mr. Gates" (1950) suggests that 
news editors select wire services stories in a subjective way. However, he is also 
quick to stress that the subjective judgements of Mr. Gates are actually limited . 
by Ms superiors and competing media. He in fact enjoys only IMe "real 
autonomy". 
Most studies on the topic come to similar conclusions, arguing that 
personal attitudes of journalists can easily be suppressed by both organizational 
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and professional needs (e.g. Kerrick, Anderson and Swales, 1964; Sigelman, 1973; 
Drew, 1975; Shoemaker, 1987). However，there are also a few studies which 
suggest that，despite being suppressed by organizational and professional factors， 
personal interests of journalists do play a part in the interpretation of news 
events. Starck and Soloski (1970) find in an experimental study that reporters 
tend to write more accurate stories on someone who looks alright to them. 
Furthermore, Gitlin，s study (1980) on media treatment of the anti-war movement 
in the United States (1980) shows that journalists，personal sympathy of the 
campaign sometimes prevailed over the media's general disapproval of the 
movement. 
One can fairly argue that both cases cited above are not sufficient 
evidence to support the influence of personal attitudes in newsmaking. Starck and 
SoloskTs study was conducted in an experimental environment under which 
reporters had no organizational and professional bindings. GitHn's case can also 
be treated as exceptions that best serve to prove the rule. But the fact that these 
exceptions exist can also imply that there are certain situations where personal 
interests of journalists are less suppressed. This may be the case when 
organizational and professional interests are not clear, as suggested by Starck and 
Soloskfs. Hiis thesis will also attempt to establish the importance of personal 
interests of journalists in news framing during a crisis situation. It will be explored 
in greater details later. 
D. The Social Context 
So far we have discussed how ” organizational", "professional" and 
"personal" interests affect journalists，perception of news events. Events will not 
mean the same to different people with different interests. Yet it should not be 
10 
ignored that meanings will also change according to variations in the social 
context. 
The "context" of a society is mainly defined by its political, 
economic and social situations. IHe social context affects the framing of news in 
_ ways. First, it provides a framework within with journalists can do their job. 
H^e political system, for example, determines the press system and in 她 defines 
the role of journalists. Hie economic and power relation of the society also sets 
limitations on the way journalists perceive things. "Radical" opinions are always 
deemed as either politically intolerable or socially unacceptable. 
However，the meaning of the word "radical" varies according to the 
clianges in the social context. Anti-war campaigns in the United States were seen 
as "radical" by the press in the 60s. Yet，it became acceptable in the 70s，while 
the US society generally felt that the countiy could not win the war (GitHn 1980). 
In Hong Kong, a number of newspapers tune down their critical stance against 
the Chinese Government，facing the political reality that China will become the 
new ruler of Hong Kong in 1997. (Chan 1987). 
Second，the social context is also like the "ground", in psychological 
tenns，against which a figure is perceived (Morgan 1961). In the same vein, the 
significance and meaning of a news event is also highlighted by its contrast with 
the social context. Any variations in the social background, no matter political, 
economic，social or others would mean changes in the meaning of events. News 
on foreign investments，for example, will be framed as an indicator of political . 
confidence in Hong Kong. In Britain, the same may well be interpreted in 




The discussion above shows that the meaning of a news event to 
journalists is mainly decided by four factors, namely ⑴ organizational interests， 
(2) professional interests (3) personal interests and (4) the social context. 
However，the relative importance of these factors in news framing 
is not constant. A. Cans (1979) rightly points out, although some consideration, 
are always relevant, the "number and mix" that go into specific stories vaiy. Hiere 
should also be a difference between the "frame mix" in normal times and in 
crises. We will discuss these differences in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ROUTINE MODE VS CRISIS MODE 
In the last chapter, we have listed various factors which decide the 
patterns of newsmaking. In this chapter, we will discuss the relative importance 
of these factors in changing with social situation. 
Most researches so far have only focused on the behaviour of news 
organizations in normal situations. Although some scholars have shown their 
interest in news operations in an "abnormal" context, such as crises and disasters, 
few have attempted to explore the differences between news reporting in the two 
contexts in a systematic way (Robinson 1970; Waxman 1973; Kueneman et al， 
1975; Scanlon et al, 1978; Whitney 1981). 
So (1982) points out the need to study systematically the two 
"modes" of reporting (routine and crisis). He suggests: 
imphcation may be that we should put more emphasis oifSe anatysis o / S 
events in order to understand how paradigms shift from oi ie:=other" ^ le 
舰 tme mode does not show much internal dynamics of the presf but s 二 
importan as object for analysis of implicit socialization and Si: 二 t L 。 
socio-political hegemony (the social construction and definitioiJ of i S ^ 
This thesis, basing on these assumptions, will tiy to trace how news 
frames shift from the routine mode to the crisis mode. 
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3,1 Definition of Crisis 
"Crisis" is a broadly defined term in social studies. It is often treated 
synonymously with stress, panic, catastrophe, disaster, violence or potential 
violence (Robinson 1968). 
For research purposes, social scientists distinguish between two 
types of crises: the consensus type and the dissensus type. Consensus type of 
crises are those when there is agreement on the meaning of the situation, the 
norms and values that are appropriate, and the priorities that should be followed 
(QuaranteUi, 1970). Natural diasters，as well as those diasters occasioned by 
technological agents, are major examples of this type of crisis. Dissensus type of 
crises are conflict-containing situations where there are sharply contrasting views 
of the nature of the situation，what brought it about, and what should be done 
to resolve it (Stallings，1973). Social conflicts, in general, fall into this category. 
Barton (1970) defines crisis as a "collective stress situation" where 
’’ many members of a social system fail to receive expected conditions from the 
system." Crisis is also a ”turning point" that distinguishes the outcome of an 
event "favourably or unfavourably, between life and death, violence or 
nonviolence and resolution or protracted conflict" ( North et al.，1963). In other 
words，a crisis can be defined as the critical stage of an incident which may 
seriuosly threaten the stability of the society. It may either jepordize the political 
stmcuire (political crisis), the economic structure (economic crisis) or the social 
structure (social crisis, natural disaters). 
Wiener and Kahn (1962) outline some important features of a 
crisis: 
⑴ Crisis is often a toning point in an unfolding sequence of events and actions。 
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f L ' ^ t t i a si加ation in which the requirement for action is high among 
S i 二 二 t i e s in assessing a situation and in formulating 
(4) Crisis reduces control over events and their effects. 
S i S r raises among participants, especially in political crisis involving 
3』News Framing: Routine Mode and Crisis Mode 
As discussed in the last chapter, the "meaning" of a news story is 
determined by the interaction between three sets of values (organizational, 
professional and personal) and variations in the social context. l i e notion of 
"frames"，defined as "persistent patterns", suggests that these factors interact with 
each other in a systematic rather than a random way. -
A. The Routine Mode 
pr^anizatioTial interest ；^c； Pnwp.rfu] FV r^tnr 
Under normal conditions, organizational interests of news media 
are usually clear and strong. Organizational policies, no matter subtle or overt, 
are usually accepted by journalists as a natural and major part of their news 
judgement (Warner 1971; Stark 1962). 
Sigelman (1969) describes how this is done. He points out that 
apart from newsroom socialization, as carefully studied by Breed (1955), news . 
organizations also control journalists through recruitment. Journalists, on the 
other hand，select the "right" news organizations to work for. Harmony is thus 
created between journalists and their employers. Organizational interests are 
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seldom challenged. They penetrate subtly into the mind of journalists and become 
a major factor guiding their interpretation of events. 
A number of studies have singled out organizational interests as the 
major factor shaping the frames of journalists (e.g. Gerbner 1964; Chan and Lee 
1984). The strongest evidence, perhaps, is DonoheVs study on newspaper reports 
on the Medicare issue in the United States. Focusing his efforts on newspapers 
in the Kentucky state, Donohew finds that, among other factors, the publisher's 
attitude alone was able to account for 50% of variance in newspaper content. The 
finding is clear enough to support the argument that, in normal times, 
organizational interests is an extremely powerful factor in the framing of news. 
Emfe^ipnal Interests as Simpressor of Personal Tnt.r.ct 
During normal times, most journalists see themselves as gatekeepers 
rather than advocates. As gatekeepers, journalists have to detach themselves from 
the outside world they observe. Journalists are cautious that, as professionals， 
their own interests and attitudes should not be reflected in news. 
Organizational interests，on the other hand, cannot be so easily 
suppressed by professional interests. One of the reasons is that, as discussed 
above，organizational policies are absorbed by journalists in an unconscious way. 
Journalists，therefore, are usually not aware that they are ’•biased" by 
organizational values. 
Personal Interests .SnpprPQc^ rj 
. The discussion above show that journalists，personal values are 
always suppressed by organizational and professional factors. 
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In normal times, journalists do not have specific attitudes towards 
most events. Even if they do, their attitudes are most probably in line with 
organizational interests as a result of selective recruitment and self-selection. In 
times when journalists disagree with organizational policies，their personal 
perceptions are still held back by professionalism. 
A5 a result, journalists can seldom put forward their views in their 
work. The best they can do is to "couch their views subtly" into news stories 
(Chan and Lee 1988). 
B. The Crisis Mode 
In a crisis, however, the relative importance of factors of news 
framing can be quite different from that in routine times. One of the possibles 
is that the personal values of the journalists are less suppressed" by both 
organizational and professional values. 
Organizatiori?^] Control Tp.w Effective 
It seems natural that a news organization tends to tighten up its 
control on its staff in case of crises (Gitlin 1980). Quite a number of news 
organizations even make it a policy that news reporting should be more cautious, 
i.e. stricter control, in crises than in normal times (Kueneman et aL, 1975). 
This may be the case in small scale crises where the situation is still 
stable and the invlovement among journalist is low. In large scale crises which 
provoke high degree of uncertainties and involvement, nevertheless, it is difficult 
for news organizations to maintain, not to mention tightening up, its control over 
journalists. In case of such a crisis, the gatekeeping system (one of the most 
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effective means to control news content) breaks down. It fails to function because 
the newsroom is overloaded with information which needs to be processed with 
utmost urgency. Waxman (1973) finds that a number of radio stations were 
actually in an "open-gate" situation during natural disasters: a situation where a 
substantial amount of information totally escapes the editorial process and go on 
the air "raw". 
Furthermore, even if a news organization can manage to control, 
its interests cannot be so clearly defined in crisis as in normal situations. Crises 
produce uncertainties. Tlie crisis situation, as a "turning point", make it extremely 
difficult for a news organization to evaluate the situation and identify its goals. 
Organizational control is likely to be weakened because of these ambiguities. 
Professional Imprests: Advocating in.tP.H ^f 广叫外。^pfn: 
In a large scale social crisis, journalists, like other members of the 
society，are likely to be involved one way or the other. Personal feelings are 
strong. Under such conditions, it would be difficult for them to act as gatekeepers 
who have to be detached from personal judgements. Instead, journalists are more 
likely to become advocates rather than gatekeepers in crises (So, 1982). 
E^r^nal Interests: Less Snpprpcc^rj 
As a result of the paralysis of organizational control and the 
adoption of the advocacy model, personal perceptions of journalists are less 
suppressed in the framing of news in crises than in normal times. 
The breakdown of the gatekeeping system lends greater power to 
the reporter to control the content of news. Reporters also become the major 
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definers of the situation，depending on their personal judgements. Tom Wicker, 
the New York Times reporter who covered the Kennedy assassination in 1963， 
describes how his "instinct" works in gathering the stoxy in crisis: ， 
check and d o u ^ a ^ f t 二 = ^^^^ or time to 
— c a n . S 二 
Being an advocate, the reporter identifies himself with certain 
groups of members in the society. He feels more confident and free to express 
his own perception in his work，assuming the support of his "client group". When 
there is no gatekeeping, the reporter's "instincts", Vhat he feels in his bones", 
become an important factor deciding how a crisis is framed in news. ， 
3.3 Routine Mode vs Crisis Mode: A Comparison 
The differences between news framing in routine and crisis 
situation can be summarized as follow: 
Smitine Crisis 
Organizational s trong Weak 
Control 
Professional Gatekeepers Advocates 
Interests 
Personal Suppressed Less 
Suppressed 
I II -|I»IBW| 
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Basing on these assumptions, this thesis will explore how the 1989 
pro-democracy movement in Beijing was framed by the Hong Kong press in both 
the routine mode and the crisis mode. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PRESS STRUCTURE IN HONG KONG 
The forty three registered daily newspapers in Hong Kong^ can be 
divided into two streams: the political press and the commercial press. (Lin, 
1977: 62; Tseng, 1973: 282) • 
4.1 The Political Press 
Politics in China is a major factor shaping the press structure in this 
British colony. Hong Kong sees a press-party parallelism growing not out of local 
politics but is "a residual extension of modern Chinese politics" (Lee 1985). In 
other words, the political press in Hong Kong identify themselves not with local 
political groups, if there are any, but with the two major political power in China: 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintong (KMT). Enjoying high 
degree of press freedom，Hong Kong has remained the major propaganda 
battlefield between Taiwan and Mainland China for over forty years. 
The interest of the Chinese Communist Party are 
chiefly represented by Wen Wei Pao and Ta Kung Pao, Technically 
speaking，both Ta Kung and Wen Wei are not directly owned by the 
Chinese government. They only call themselves ’，newspapers of the 
patriotic united front under the leadership of the Chinese Communist . 
Party". ^ However, it is open secret that both newspapers are financially 
1 The Hong Kong Yearbook 1989, pp.267. 
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backed up by the Communist Party. Hie local branch of the New China 
News Agency (NCNA), the major CCP organ in Hong Kong, holds the 
decisive power to appoint senior staff of both newspapers.^  
Hie Kuomintong, on the other hand, control the 
Ho""经 Kong T i鹏 as its mouthpiece in Hong Kong. Being a newspaper 
owned by the Central Committee of the KMT, the major goal of the Times 
is to "counter communist propaganda" in Hong Kong. ^ Like the leftist 
press，the Times is also financed by the Party. Its publisher is directly 
appointed by KMT. After the closure of Kung Sheung Daily News in late 
1984，the Times became the only rightist newspaper in Hong Kong. 
《2 The Commercial Press 
Apart from the few partisan newspapers mentioned above, the 
majority of the Hong Kong Press are commercial newspapers with no explicit 
partisanship. 
The commercial press in Hong Kong started to develop in the late 1950s 
(Lee, 1987). However, it did not get the chance to prosper until the 1966 riot 
which raised the demand for more locally oriented mass media ( Kuan and Lau, 
1988). Since then, co醒ercial newspapers have grown rapidly and become the 
dominators of the market. 
The primaiy goal of commercial newspapers is to make profit by 
attracting the largest possible number of readers. Most commercial newspapers 
do not want to jeopardize their business by committing themselves deeply to a 
r e s 咖 ? S e T o n t t i S 細 — ， ^ ^ 。 跨 director of NCNA, in My , 1989 when NCNA had to 
4 Interview with a Deputy Chief Editor of the Hong Kong Times. 
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political stand. In contrast with the political press, they have little or no 
identification with either the CCP or the KMT. The usually claim themselves as 
"independent press" or "centrist" press. 
Particular successful among the commercial newspapers are the 
O 一 Daily Nem, Sing Pao, Tin Tin Daify N鳴 and Ming Pao. With a total 
daily circulation of more than one million copies, they top the circulation of all 
Chinese newspapers/ 
4.3 Framing Chinese News: The Routine Mode 
A5 pointed out in the last chapter, news framing in the routine 
situation is mainly determined by the interest of the news organization in the 
news event. In Hong Kong, this has also been confirmed by a number of studies 
(e.g. So 1982; Chan and Lee 1984; Lee 1987). When reporting news regarding 
China, the political intersts of the news organization become a more outstanding 
factor in determining how the news is framed. Different frames are expected to 
be found in the leftist, rightist and commercial newspapers. 
I M i ^ f M l ^ : Both Wen Wei and Ta Rung have been following the 
official line of the CCP closely ever since they were controlled by the 
NCNA in Hong Kong. Although they have enjoyed relatively higher 
autonomy after Mr. Xu Jiatun became the director of the Hong Kong 
branch of NCNA in 1983，they cannot deviate from the official stand in 
important political issues such as the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign 
^ - g ， a circulation over 650 thousand. 
average figures from July to D e c e m b t l g p T o ^ t j ^ ^ t ；4 �宏尸 f ^ y咖皿d 130 thousand. These are 
1990. 】 ‘丄州^ provided by the Asia's Media and Market Weekly, May 18， 
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and the "anti-bourgeois liberalism" campaign. ^ In fact, there had not been 
a single case before the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 that the leftist 
newspapersopenly broke away from the Party line. 
Press: As Chan (1987) points out, "in the past, 
让e rightist as well as the centrist newspapers are characterized by 
their cordial relationships with the Hong Kong Government and 
their rejection of China" (pp. 20). This was particularly the case 
during the 1967 riot, while the centrist newspapers joined the 
rightist in condemning the leftist of ruining Hong Kong. Ming Pao, 
for example, was reported to have taken a critical stand in 77.8 % 
of its editorials focusing on the Chinese Government (Lee, 1988). 
However，the sceptical stand towards Beijing gradually 
softened as the PRC adopted the open door policy in the late 1970，s. As 
the PRC became one of the biggest business partner of Hong Kong, no 
more "critical editorials" was found in Ming Pao since 1983 (Lee, 1988) 
The commercial press changed its attitude towards the 
communist regime more explicitly after the signing of the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong in 1984. Although some 
newspapers，such as Sing Pao and Oriental Daily, had s h 麵 clear 
reservations towards China's decision to regain the sovereignty of Hong 
Kong, they are less reserved in welcoming the Joint Declaration as a 
reasonable framework for the future of Hong Kong. Since the signing of 
the agreement in December 1984，both newspapers were found to have 
J J S ^ i C i i S l l 。 r 二二【=，Kong way； Ue C o — — , 
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treated China more favourably in their editorials. (Chan 1987). 
According to editors in both Ming Poo and Sing Pao, the 
prime concern of their newspapers is to maintain the stability and 
prosperity in Hong Kong/ A stable China is obviously a key factor in 
achieving this. In routine situation, therefore, it is expected that although 
commercial newspapers will be more balanced than the leftist papers in 
reporting news regarding China, it will be keen to avoid being too critical 
towards the Communist regime that is going to take over Hong Kong in 
1997. 
Hie Hong Kong 77鹏 has taken a 
strong anti-communist stand since its establishment in Hong Kong. 
Adopting rigid KMT policy, the Times does not recognize the 
legitimacy of the Communist regime. To indicate its non-
recognition，the Times extensively put quotation marks around 
institutions and officials related to the Beijing regime. 
As a result of this solid political stand, the Times puts 
most of the news relating to the communist regime into a "and-
communist" context. ” It is just natural that we pay more attention 
to the dark side and instability of the CCP，" a deputy chief editor 
of the Times remarks, “ We do not make up facts. But as the only 
anti-Commnnist newspaper in Hong Kong, we have to provide the 
right perspective for the readers to interpret the facts."« 
The signing of the Joint Declaration did alter the Timef 
7 Personal Interviews. May 21，1990 and May 31，1990. 
8 Personal interview, May 29，1990, 
25 
framing of China slightly. Chan (1987) reports that since 1984, NCNA not 
only appears frequently but also more neutrally in the Times, However, 
Chan also observed that this change is only a “ tactical f from hardline 
anti-Commimism to more rational anti-commimism" (Chan 1987: 60). 
Because of the political reality, the Times cannot ignore the power of CCP 
in the shaping of local politics. However, the major goal of the Times is 
to counter communist influence in Hong Kong. Hiis goal has not changed. 
The Times does not believe in the notion of "one countiy, two systems" 
from the very beginning. ^ According to a deputy chief editor of the 
Ti鹏’ the rightist paper does not owe the success of Hong Kong to a 
stable PRC even at present. "We do not have the 1997 sentiment； he said, 
”We do not see any reason why we should soften our anti-Commimist 
stand because of 1 9 9 7 . " 工 。 
In short, there is no fundamental change in Times' 
attitude towards PRC after the signing of the Joint Declaration. 
Although the tactics could be more flexible, its anti-Communist 
theme remains the same. The Times would not hesitate to frame 
the Communist regime in a negative way if the chance is right. 
1。Interview，May 29，1990. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
HYPOTHESES, THE CASE AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Hypotheses 
Based on our previous argument on the routine mode and crisis 
mode of news framing, the following hypotheses are generated: 
I. In routine times, the organizational interest of newspapers is a more 
powerful factor in news framing than the journalists，personal interest 
n. In a crisis, personal inclinations of the journalists will be less suppressed 
by newspapers，organizational interest in news framing than it is in 
routine times. 
"Routine times" are defined as normal situations where the 
political, economic and social structure are stable. In the routine times, the 
process ofnewsmaking is usually done in a systematic and institutionalized way. 
"Crisis" is defined as the turning point of any incident which 
seriously threatens the stability of the political structure (political crisis), the 
economic structure (economic crisis) and social structure (social). IHere are two 
major features of a crisis. First, as a "turning point"，a crisis is 聰ally fall of 
m t o . Second, as a serious threat to the stability of the society, a crisis 
腿 ally draws highdegree involvenient among members of the society. 
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52 The Case 
顶e 1989 pro-democracy movement in China provides a good case 
for examining the differences in news framing between routine and crisis 
situation. The movement was triggered off by the death of Hu Yaobang, the 
former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, in mid April 1989. 
Tens of thousands of students took to the street to moum Hu，s death. They also 
took the chance to ask for more freedom, more democracy and cleaning up 
corruption. 
The situation was well under control at first. The whole movement 
seemed like nothing different from another student movement in late 1986，which 
gradually died down after a few months of marches and demonstrations. 
However，the government opted to adopt a tougher line this time. Denouncing 
the movement as "a conspiracy to negate the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP)；' ^ the government refused to hold dialogue with the 
students. Hie students, in turn, protested by occupying the Tiananmen Square 
and staging a hunger strike. Millions of Beijing citizens supported the students by 
taking part in the largest spontaneous political rally in the Chinese capital in forty 
years. 
The movement gradually turned into a crisis following the sharp 
confrontation between the government and the people. Premier Li Peng imposed 
martial law on Beijing on May 20. But the people and the students did not back 
off. Hie deadlock lasted for half a month. Nobody would be surprised when the 
government finally decided to extinguish the whole movement and recapture the 
Square. Yet, no one would have expected that the leaders had chosen to use 
1 P e o p l e D a i l y , A p r i l 26, 1989. 
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tanks and machine guns to accomplish the task on June 4. 
Crisis，is defined as the "turning point" of an important event which 
causes a great deal of uncertainties and high degree of involvement. The 
development of the June 4 incident fits well with this criterion. Since the 
imposition of the martial law, nobody was sure where things were leading to. The 
govennnent could have decided to "restore the order" of the capital in any 
minute. The power struggle between Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and 
Premier Li Peng has added to the mysteries of the situation. On the other hand, 
the involvement among Chinese people，not only in the Mainland but also all 
over the world, to this heart-rending movement needs no farther elaborations. 
Tlie development of the June 4 massacre also represented a major 
crisis in Hong Kong. When Hong Kong people witnessed this poignant pro-
democracy movement terminated in bloodshed, only eight years were left before 
this British colony has to be handed back to the connnunist regime. People in 
Hong Kong had been supportive of the students since the movement unfolded 
One million people marched amid typhoon and heavy rain to protest the 
imposition of the martial law. After the massacre, one 幽 o n people gathered 
again to ask for trials against prominent Chinese leaders. Like China, Hong Kong 
was also featured with tension, involvement and uncertainties. 
Tlie public appearance of Deng Xiaoping on June 9，however, 
clearly indicated that the Comnumist leadership led by China's strong 醒 was 
firmly in control. Uter in the month, the Co醒unist Party fonnalty restructured 
its top leadership in a Party meeting. General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was ousted. 
Since then, the situation in China was gradually stabilized. 
In respect to our differentiation between the routine mode and the 
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crisis mode of news framing, the development of the Tiananmen Square Incident 
can be divided into four stages: 
九 The First Stage ( Routine )•• From April 15 to April 25 was the 
&st stage. Tens of thousands of students marched on the streets to 
moum the death of Hu Yaobang. There were confrontations at the 
gate of Zongnanhai, the residence compound of China's leaders. 
Riots broke out in Xian and Changsha. However, the situation was 
still under the control of the Chinese Government The degree of 
uncertainties and involvement was low. 
B. The Second Stage (Transitional): From April 26 to May 18 was the 
second stage. Tlie April 26 People、Daily editorial, labelling the 
movement as a conspiracy to overturn the Communist rule, gave the 
&st sign of government suppression. The students，hunger strike 
beginning on May 13 won the sympathy of the mass. TTie student 
movement gradually became a large scale civil protest. Hie 
situation slowly moved from routine to crisis. 
C The third Stage (Crisis): TOs was the crisis stage. Hie crisis began 
on May 19，when Premier Li Peng disclosed that troops were called 
into Beijing. Martial was imposed the next day. Hie hunger strike 
went on. At the same time, a severe power struggle took place in 
Zongnanhai. Tlie whole situation was full of uncertainties and 
anxieties. H^e peak of the crisis, needless to say, was the massacre 
on June 4. 
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D. The Fourth Stage ( Back to Routine ): The public appearance of 
paramoiint Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping on June 9 gave a clear 
indication that the conservative fraction of the Communist Party 
was standing firm on its feet. Step by step, the Chinese government 
regained control over the situation. Tlie Party meeting on June 24 
formally ended the uncertainties in the Chinese leadership. Jiang 
Zemin was elected the new Party leader. Zhao Ziyang, accused of 
’,splitting the Party", was ousted. From then on, the situation in 
China was gradually normalized. 
5.3 Research Method 
A. Sampling 
In order to test the hypotheses, five newspapers, representing 
different categories in the Hong Kong press structure, are selected to be studied. 
They are: 
L^fto: Ta Rung Pao and Wen Wei Pao, 
.CommerdH]： Ming Pao and Sing Pao, 
Rightist: Hong Kong Times, 
B. Method 
The two hypotheses of this research will be tested by both content 





First, stories relating to the Beijing pro-democracy movement in the 
five sampled newspapers are carefully analyzed to find out how different types 
of newspapers (leftist, commercial and rightist) framed the movement in different 
stages (routine—transitional— crisis- routine). Emphasis is put on finding out 
whether the news frames are in line with the interest of the news organizations. 
It is expected that during the first stage of the incident, when the 
situation was still stable, the three types of newspapers will frame the student 
movement in completely different ways, each according to their 麵 
organizational line. As the situation gradually turned into a crisis, personal 
inclinations became the major factor in news framing. H^e news frames in the 
three camps of newspapers is expected to converge. After the situation was 
stabilized，news framing was again dominated by organizational interests. Tlie 
differences among the leftist, commercial and rightist newspapers is expected to 
recur. 
The method of qualitative analysis is used. All news reports in 
these five newspapers relating to the movement from April 16，1989 to 
September 31, 1989 are intensively studied. It is observed that relevant reports 
gradually died down since October. Careful comparisons are made between 
different newspapers to reveal their different themes and emphasis on the same 
story. 
In-depth TntPrvi•⑶ 
Although the method of content analysis is able to tell us how the 
framing of the movement differs between the routine mode and the crisis mode, 
it is not sufficient to prove that these differences were due to the dominant role 
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of the journalists，personal inclinations in news framing in crises. It is only 
. t h r o u g h in-depth interviews with reporters and editors who actually took part in 
the coverage are we able to identify the major factors in news framing in 
different stages. 
A total of thirteen journalists in the five sampled newspapers were 
interviewed. All the key reporters who were sent to Beijing to cover the 
movement were included. Furthennore, at least one senior editorial member in 
each paper who was then responsible for content control was also interviewed. 
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way, each 
lasted no less than one and a half hour. First, all journalists were asked to 
identify the organizational interest of their newspapers and describe the control 
of newspaper content during normal times. Then, they were encouraged to 
d i s _ freely their experience during different stages of the movement. Special 
emphasis was put to find out the organizational control in the newsroom during 
crisis and routine situation as well as their personal involvement in the 
movement. 
The findings of the content analysis and the interviews are reported 
in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MSSENSUS IN ROUTINE MODE: THE FIRST STAGE 
During the first stage of the student movement, the three types of 
newspapers，(leftist, commercial and rightist) framed the movement with 
significant difference, each according to its organizational interests. THe findings 
supported our hypothesis that during normal times, news framing is usually 
dominated by organizational interests of the newspapers rather then personal 
inclinations of the journalists. 
Key Events During The First Stage (April 15 to April 25 ) 
April 15 Hu Yaobang, the former General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party, died in Beijing. imnese 
April 17 Thousands of Beijing students marched to the Tiananmen Scuare 
， y f ina l ly asked the government to reevaluate 
二 c ; . 二 — c a l demands including ； = = 
April 19 Demonstrators clashed with policemen at the front .ate of 
Zongnanhai, the residence of senior leaders. g of 
April 20 Confrontations took place at Zongnanhai again. Policemen broke 
up the crowd by force. A numbe/of peoplegweie^s^ed 
APhi ' ' : held in Beijing. Tens of thousands of 
S ^ n the Tiananmen square. Riots broke out at 
April 23 Students of five universities in Beijing decided to go on strike Thev 
also appeal for a nation wide class boycott. ey 
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Q The Leftist Press 
Both Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao followed the official line of 
the CCP closely during this stage. The student movement was depoHticized by 
both leftist newspapers . The marches and demonstrations of students were 
framed as ways to express their grievances over the death of Hu Yaobang rather 
than a movement to fight for democracy and freedom. 
On April 17，over one thousand students of the College of Political 
Science and I^w marched from their campus to the Tiananmen Square, chanting 
pro-democracy slogans such as ” long live democracy "，“ long live freedom ”，“ 
cbwn with corruption “ and " down with bureaucracy TOs was the first time 
political demands emerged since the death of Hu Yaobang. Both Ta Kung Pao 
and Wen Wei Pao paid little attention to these demands. Ta Kun, Pao, for 
example，reported the march as part of the mourning activities all over the 
country. 
The Ta Kung story was placed under the following headline: 
the Nation Spontaneously Held Activities to Pay Respect to 
Ilie lead of the story, which usually identifies the nature of the 
news and sums up the whole stoiy, did not mention the march at all ： 
Unt 丄 二 = = 二 
1 Ta Kung Pao, April 18, 1989. 
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the monument. At its peak, there were hundreds of people.^ 
Hie march itself was then mentioned in the second paragraph, with only 
two sentences. Il.e number of students took part in the march was also scaled 
down from "over one thousand", as reported by other newspapers, to "over five 
hundred"： 
gathered at the Monument to the People's Heroes to pay tribute to Hu Yaobang.3 
There was no mention of the political demands of the students. 
臉 • P。o handled the stoiy in a similar way. Although the 
march was described by the Wen Wei reporter as the 'T.iggest student rally in 
recent years’，\ the message was buried in the last paragraph in the lowest part 
of the page. 
The leftist press stuck to the "mourning frame" throughout the first 
stage of the student movement. Students and other people clashed with the police 
outside Zongnanhai in two consecutive nights (April 18 and April 19). Ta Rung 
Pao, while playing down the scale of the clash, described the clashes as "new 
dimensions of mourning activities". ^  It referred to the demonstrators as "students 
and youths of the society" who marched and petitioned to mounx Hu's death". 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Wen Wei Pao, April 18，1989. 
5 Ta KungPao, April 19，1989. 
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Framing the whole thing as part of the mourning activities over 
Hifs death served to de-politicize the movement. Our content analysis shows that 
the political demands of the students asking for freedom and democracy were 
reported only 4 times in Ta Kun, Poo and 5 times in Wen Wei Poo, comparing 
to 12 times in Ming Pao, 20 times in Sing Poo and 25 times in the Hong Kong 
Times. 
The selection of words served as another means to de-politicize the 
movement. Throughout the first stage, the word "demonstration" was never found 
in either the Ta Kung Pao or the Wen Wei Pao. "Demonstrators" were often 
referred to as "crowds" and "people". The word "march" was used only a few 
times. It was often substituted with "walk" or "move". 
There were at least two incidents during this period that might 
jeopardize the validity of the W n i n g frame". One of them was the clashes at 
ZongnanhaL The other was the riots in Xian and Changsha. In both cases, the 
incidents were framed by the leftist press in a way which suggested that the 
trouble was caused by other elements in the society. It was implied that the 
troubles had nothing to do with the students or mourning. They were not political 
either. The main theme of students' activities was still to express their sorrow 
over the death of Hu Yaobang. By doing so, the frame preferred by the leftist 
newspapers can be defended. 
Tliese frames were made explicit by the reporting of the leftist press 
on the above mentioned incidents. Reporting the first gathering outside 
Zongnanhai on April 18，both Ta Kun, Pao and Wen Wei Pao implied that the 
trouble was not caused by students. Ta Kung Pao stated this very clear in its 
headline: 
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“Someone tried to enter Zongnanhai by force; 
helped to maintain order."‘ 
The story went: 
used. No one was injured. journalists at tHe scene, no violence was 
胸胸’also reported on the same day that "there were other 
elements in the crowd except students".‘ 
The stance of the leftist press revealed itself more clearly if we compare 
these reports to a South China Morning Post report on the same day:— 
6 Ta Kung Pao, April 19, 1989. 
7 Wen Wei Pao, April 19，1989. 
8 South China Morning Post, April 19，1989. 
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It can be seen that no effort had been made at all in the Post 
report to identify "other elements" from the "students". 
On the second day of the clashes, Ta Rung Pao made its stance 
even clearer by farther distinguishing students from the "troublemakers": 
^ ^ . , 。 B y two o'clock this morning, students and youths of the . n nV ty who 
parched and petitioned to mourn Hu's death still gatLred and sat in fmnT of 
c = u = to force their way into Zong'nanhai again for = 二 
consecutive day, demanding to speak to senior leaders such as Li Peng. 
marched ^ e incident last night, thousands of students and youths 
^arch^d from the Ti^anmen Square to Xinhuamen. They put forward t ^ 
i f i Z ^ rndShagam Tliey also chanted slogans and ask to talkto senTLaier 
Judpng from how th. c^thm.”" ^^ ns or^nized nnH th. ti^。nrtArnnt 
a o k ^ n d acted, students、^;^^^^ti^v nntn.^hered hv n t h J .i^niem^ ' ^ 
On April 22，riots broke out in Xian as well as Changsha. Cars and 
buildings were burnt. Government offices were stormed. Shops were looted. 
When reporting these incidents, special attention was paid by the leftist press to 
distinguish the "rioters" from the students. 
The lead story on Ta Rung Pao the day after the riot was not about 
the riot itself. It was a stoiy quoting students in Changsha and Xian as saying that 
they had nothing to do with the riots. It also quoted a Beijing student activist 
condemning the violence^ Tlie story in fact was translated from materials 
provided by foreign news agencies (Reuters, AFP and AP). This was the only 
time during this period that the leftist press had based its lead story on materials 
provided by foreign agencies. 
Ilie stoiy telling the details of the riots was also framed to 
differentiate between students and rioters. It was stressed in the Ta Kung Pao 
9 Ta Kung Pao, April 20, 1989. 
10 Ta Kung Pao, April 24，1989 
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headline that ” among the two hundred arrested in the two riots, most were ex-
convicts", implying that the chaos were not started by students. “ Wen Wei Pao 
also carried the clear message in the first paragraph that “ according to a source, 
no university student was arrested in yesterday's riots" ！2 H^e framing of the riots 
as well as the Xinhuamen clashes clearly show that the leftist press was keen to 
give the impression that there was no student democratic movement nor student 
demonstrations. AH students wanted was to express their sorrow over the death 
of Hu Yaobang. 
The way which the Xian and Changsha riots were reported yet 
revealed another frame of the leftist press -- despite riots and demonstrations, the 
situation was still under the control of the Chinese Government. H^ere was no 
sign that things will get worse. 
Both Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao dedicated the fim 
paragraph, of the riot story to this theme: 
化 驗 ^ c i t y of Xian was basically quiet on April 23. Students spent the 
Sunday as usual. Tliere was no march in the streets N r i ^ P ^ t i J t 
淨 ere found on university campuses. Shops opened is usuaT a T ^ 
Wei: Xian w ^ quiet today after yesterday's riot. Traffic restrictions were 
让e 跑che/g Square at ‘ ^ 0 ^ = = ^ 
v.mcies,except three bus routes, were prohibited to drive through 
“ I b i d 
12 Wen Wei Pao, April 24，1989. 
Ta Kung Pao, April 24, 1989. 
“Wen Wei Pao, April 24，1989 
This treatment on the riot stoiy was found to be unique in the 
leftist press. On the same day, all other newspapers dedicated the first paragraph 
of the stoiy to damages of the riot, rather than the peaceftilness in the two cities 
after the looting and arson. 
As a result of the "under control" frame, out-of-control elements 
such as clashes and violence were played down. One such example was the Ta 
勤容 report on the clashes between demonstrators and the police outside 
Zongnanhai on April 18. report described in detail what happened at 
Xinhuamen that night: 
Tlie description implied that the crowd had been pushing forward 
because of curiosity: they wanted to know what was going on in the front It was 
an accident. There was no clash, no violence nor was there any intention to enter 
Zongnanhai by force. 
Compare the Ta Kung Pao report above with the stoiy written by 
Hong Kong Standard on the same day: 
soldiers. Some 5,000 onlookers cheered them on as they clashed w '^th 
^ r。Kung Pao, April 19，1989. 
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Congress. ^^  et Mr Wan Li, chairman of the National People，s 
It can be seen that the Standard story was totally different from Ta 
~，s . According to the Standard, it was a simple student-police clash. Ta 
，on the other hand, tried to frame the story in a way to show that the 
clashes were accidental rather than political. 
Apart from clashes and violence, organized protests by the students 
were also play down by the leftist press. Beijing students went on strike on April 
24. That was the most organized protest by the students so far. Furthermore, 
since the funeral of Hu Yaobang was already over by the time the strike started! 
it can not be contained by the "mourning ” frame. As a result, neither Ta Kung 
nor Wen Wei wrote more than 4 paragraphs on the story, comparing to 10 
paragraphs in Ming Pao, 7 in Sin诉o and 9 in Hong Kong Times. stoxy was 
also placed at the lower part of the page to indicate its triviality. 
Tlie strike was also trivialized by the way the story was written. 
Wen Wei, for example, implied in the headline " 建 university students in 
Beijing l e p M ^ to boycott class today" ” that not all students supported the 
boycott. 
On the day the strike actually took place, Ta Kung Pao framed the 
story in a similar way. With the headline: “ 35 universities in Beijing on strike; 
students in Shanghai and Guangdong"，Ta Kun, Pao 
� Hong Kong Standard’ April 19，1989. 
” Wen Wei Pao, April 14，1989. 
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suggested that the strike did not have the nationwide impact expected by Beijing 
students. 
Both Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao used the official Xinhua 
dispatch as the major story on the strike: 
, , ( A j ) r i l 24, Xinhua) Students of some universities in Beijing did not go to 
today. Teaching activities in most schoo]. were normal. ^ 
strike J 二 i ^ Z U=ers|ty and Beijing Normal College, students support the 
^tnke stopped other students from entering classrooms. In the College ofPolitical 
Science and Uw, some students were stopped on their way to exagminali^ 
in the libll^atfaPrrtdSinUg1=:^，i8S加dents who . o u i d ^ g o to class h ^ stay 
胸 • Pao went on with some observations by its staff reporters: 
. . , Students of the Beijing University went on strike today. It was 
i e ; g ’ were stnkes of vanons c i e 裏 in thirty one universities^ 
Both Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao implied that the strike was 
unorganized and small in scale. It was also suggested that a number of students 
did not join the strike voluntarily. On the same day, the Reuters reported that 
one hundred thousand students took part in the strike. It was also reported that 
students in other cities were prepared to follow suit. For our study, it does not 
matter whether the leftist press or the Reuters had told the "truth", what matters 
is the different ways by which they perceived what the truth was. 
6.3 The Commercial Press 
Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao, April 25, 1989. 
19 Wen Wei Pao, April 25, 1989. 
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Unlike the leftist press, commercial newspapers in Hong Kong paid 
attention to the democratic demands of Beijing students from the very beginning 
of the student movement The first students' march on April 18 was described by 
彻 g 尸oo as a "demonstration" rather than a mourning.龙 
™ s was pointed out clearly in the SingPao,s eye-catching headline 
of the lead story on April 19 ： 
職g 斤仏 on the other hand, handled the story in a slightly 
different way. Instead of singling out the democratic demands of the students in 
the first paragraph of the story, it reported simultaneously the two themes of the 
march: 
their gnef overTe d t r ^ m f v ^ r 灿 i n Beijing marched to e ^ 
However, following the clashes outside Zongnanhai, boihMingPao 
and Sing Pao were quick to shift their focus to the conflict between the students 
and the authorities. Ming Pao, for example, emphasised the tension between 
students and policemen in the first part of the stoiy: 
According to UPI, a crowd of five hundred students was dispersed 
^ Sing Pao, April 19，1989. 
by plain-cloth policemen. But Reuters and AFP reported that hundreds of 
students were still staging a sit-in outside Zongnanhai. 
, A t about ten o'clock last night, thousands of students marched from 
tiie Tiana^en Square to the Zongnanhai. They gathered in front of Xinhuamen 
Studenf kept shouting "no beating" and "no arrest", as there were rumours that 
a number of people were arrested when the students clashed with the police 
p e y also reiterated their seven demands and asked to speak with Premier Li 
Peng. 
, v . i 1 虹ge number of policemen rushed to the scene later. Roads 
leading to Xinhuamen were blocked. Students and onlookers, which numbered 
^over ten thousand, were asked to leave. The students refused to leave at first 
There were moments of a tense standoff before people gradually went away. 
The Xinhuamen was first stormed yesterday morning. University 
students mai^y from the People's University, tried to force their way into 
Zongnanhai. Tliey demanded to talk to Li Peng and other leaders. Tlie situation 
was once very tense....'' 
It can be seen that most of the first part of the story was about the 
tension outside Zongnanhai. The phrase that "the situation was once very tense" 
appeared twice in the first five paragraphs. If we compare this report to that by 
the leftist press which we have discussed earlier, we can see that Ming Pao had 
not made any effort to explain the reason why the students clashed with the 
police. There was also no intention at all to distinguish students from "other 
elements" in the crash. 
Pao gave a similar account, emphasising the tension rather 
than anything else. The headline of the Sing Pao stoiy was printed in red: ” 
Beijing students stormed Zongnanhai in two consecutive nights". ^ Not only was 
it printed in an unusual colour, it was also unusual in size. The headline spreads 
from the right of the page through the left, looking like a red banner on the top 
21 Ming Pao, April 20, 1989. 
Sing Pao, April 20, 1989 
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of the page. The unusualness of the headline gave the readers the impression that 
Beijing was in a tense situation. 
However，like Ming Pao, Sing Pao did not tiy to explore the cause 
or the nature of the tension. Hiere was no specific mention of the students' 
demands. Like Ming Pao, it was only interested in the tension itself. 
The ‘tension frame，was also applied to the reporting of the riots 
in Xian and Changsha. Neither Mng Pao nor Sing Pao had a correspondent in 
any of the two cities. Both depended on the official New China News Agency as 
the major source of information. Boil^MingPao and Sing Pao stuck to the official 
accusation that the riots were started by "rioters" and "hooligans" without raising 
any doubts. The most plausible explanation may be that both newspapers paid no 
attention to the political implications of the story at all. It was the conflict and 
the tense situation that was perceived as the theme of the story. Since there was 
a full account on the tension and the conflict, all other elements became less 
important. 
6.4 The Rightist Press 
As predicable by its political affiliation, the Hong Kong Times, from 
the very beginning, framed the student movement as anti-government and anti-
Comnumist. On April 16 (one day after the death of Hu Yaobang), a number 
of pro-democracy posters were found in university campuses. Tliese posters were 
interpreted by the Times as “ protesting against the connnunist suppression; 
urging to fight for democracy", ^ It also carried a news analysis on the same day. 
making its point more clearly: 




deeply suppresindllfh^s，especial；^ university students, feel that they are 
de2S of Efi f ^ l ^ i Commmj^st Party tightened up its control recently Tli， 
s t l h ^ o 二 二 to let the^ feeling out. r S 
again expres^ their d e m t d n e f ^ r l ^ S a t 二 砠 ^ ： ^ “ ^ 口 ^ ^ ； ^ ， 聊 may 
It was not surprising, then, the first student march on the following 
day (April 17) was again reported as a protest against Communist rule. TOs 
theme was highlighted in the headline: 
“Students took the chance to criticize the Communist Party."-
In fact, the ‘facts，quoted by the Hong Kong Times report about the 
march was almost the same as that quoted in the commercial press. Stress was 
pm on pro-democracy slogans such as "long live democracy" and "long live 
freedom". However, these slogans were put within a anti-Communist context by 
the Times. 
The Times, report on the clashes outside Zongnanhai was also 
confined within the anti-govemxnent frame. On the first day of the clash on April 
18，- Times stated in the headline that the students asked Premier Li Peng to 
resign. The demand was not found in any other newspapers in Hong Kong on the 
same day. On the second clash the following day, a more sensational headline 
was used by the 77聰 to stress the anti-Communism nature of the movement: 
— - and T i _ D 麵 
. : " M a l d n g use of the dead to criticize those alive，" HongKong Times，April 17，1989. 
Hong Kong Times, April 18, 1989. 
Hong Kong Times, April 19,1989. 
� Hong Kong Times, April 20, 1989. 
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The Hong Kong Times was also the only newspaper in Hong Kong 
which interpreted the riot in Xian as anti-govemment in nature. Again, the 
headline of the story was the major tool used to stress this theme: 
二 p e o p l e chanted anti-Connnunist slogans in Xian 
；students 
According to the Times, people who took part in the riot were students 
protesting against Communist rule. Tliey were never labelled as rioters or 
hooligans as the leftist or the commercial papers did: 
of y/n Xian Samrday. Tens of thousands 
moum Hu Yaobang's death and 
by the crowd. S i S ^ S l S S S E e g l l l ^ ^ b f ing was besieged 
c l - e d that s o l i i ^ ^ i ^ T ^ ^ W 
S a t u r d a y 二 a g e n c y , the riot in Xian started 
that the crowd ^ ^^^ agencies reported 
the g o v • 二 S ^ d S r ' ， i n — k g 咖 — s ’ then burnt a small house beside 
denaocrac J t S l ！S：：! ^ o r S ' c S , S e 貼 跑 g ^ ^ 
“down with a™ normal College, there was a banner written 
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,, , 1 A foreign teacher said there were demonstration evervH^^ v 
throughout the week. H^e atmosphere in the campus was b o r t e r S ^ d 
吣p ,沿址ua news agency reported the Xian riot in detail But there 
= = j e v e ， ？ o ， w h i c h contradicted with reports by f o r S I n c S 
笠 r ^ g n ' o ^nhua, those who took part in the r j were i k = S l e S e n t s It' 
S S o 1 ? 1 ^ ， t they were actually students and o r d i n : ' 二 1 
p o U c e ^ ^ y ot mention that students had been beaten up by 
Compare the Times report with the Xinhua account of the riot, 
which was used by most Hong Kong newspapers : 
令』,….There were ” da zha ginn^ — w ’, ( ^ ‘ y� -
yesterday Some i m l a M u i d e M set fire on cars and houses both o u t s S : 
Of students who S r ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
meeting was held orderly at first. IT^en the unlawful elemenrbegan S S 
S i r 二 二 二 
二 二 = : S e = c k ， a l s o 二 . S — ‘ X = ， = 
There are three major differences between the two reports. 
First, according to the Times, people who took part in the riot were students and 
ordinary people. Xinhua said they were "unlawful" elements. Students "left the 
scene" after the situation became out of control. Second, the Times implied that 
the crowd was enraged by the policemen who beat up the students. Xinhua gave 
^ Hong Kong Times, April 23, 1989, 
C l ^ a which refers to the unlawftj activities in a riot. 
)means fighting; ？zha^  ( s S i l T g t ^ S g l T g p i ^ C j ^ l ^ ^ ^ u - ^ Chinese "da"( 
( ) m e a n s setting fire. 。山cuimg m[o pieces, qiang ( ) means looting and "shaw" 
Ta Kung Pao, April 24，1989. 
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no reason for the riot, suggesting that the whole thing was the result of hooligans' 
deviant behaviour. Third, the Times singled out anti-Communist slogans in the 
rally，trying to play it up as the theme of the demonstration. Xmhua, on the other 
hand，try to play it down. Only some "anti-revolutionary" slogans were mentioned. 
No details were given. Tliese differences made one point clear. Hie Hong Kong 
Ti鹏 was trying the give the impression that what happened in Xian was a 
righteous anti-Communist movement. Tlie riot started because it was 
unreasonably suppressed by the authority. 
T i鹏 also paid special attention to the anti-Deng Xiaoping 
semiinem among the students. Apart from stressing anti-Deng posters and slogans 
while reporting the student movement, Times also carried three special reports 
on the topic, one of the reports said that Deng might have to resign because 
of the student movement: 
an附；••？Zf more sensitive is the fact that students have directed their 
，nger at Deng Xiaoping in the movement. ....This reflects the generally stronJ 
f o m e n t on Deng among the people and Communist c a d r ^ l f s ^ ^ I h S ^ ^ g 
pro-democracy student movement, together with the conflic 二 ? 二 
； 1 eventually force Deng to leave the stage. Tl.is is indeed a dangerou^ 
Hie Communist Party, in turn, was framed by the Times as not 
being able to tolerate these challenges. Times, in fact, was the first to suggest that 
the movement would be brutally suppressed by the Chinese government. As 
early as April 18 (three days after the death of Hu), Times carried a report 
18, ^ l ^ a t i y ，丑 o ^容 r _ ’ April 
APHU9，腳；ana “ F c c i n / o ^ n , to 
32 
“Forcing Deng to resign: a dangerous signal," Hong Kong Times, April 22，1989. 
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headlined ’The Chinese Communist Party will use force to stop the student 
movement from spreading". Quoting a "Western diplomat"，it said the government 
would not tolerate the movement to go any farther because the situation was 
already unstable". 
On April 21, the Chinese official media warned the public not to 
take the chance of Hu，s death to do anything illegal. Times interpreted this as a 
signal of the tough attitude of the Chinese government In a special report, Times 
said: 
seems that the Commnmst Party m n Hn nothing bettpr th^^n - I 咖 虹 us 顶 s IS what 
Tlie "suppression frame" of the Times is made clear by these 
remarks. 
6.5 Summary 
The leftist press: Both Ta Kung Fao and Wen Wei Pao framed the marches 
and demonstrations of students during this stage as activities to moum the 
death of Hu Yaobang. Political implications of the movement were played down. 
Other "unlawful elements" caused violence and riots. But the situation was still 
well under the control of the government. 
Tlie CO麵ercial press: Tlie commercial press interpreted the 
movement as "pro-democracy" from the very beginning. Yet, no attention was 
妇 Hong Kong Times, April 18, 1989. 
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paid to the political significance of the movement. Instead, both Ming Pao and 
彻 g Pao were more interested in clashes and tension between students and the 
government. 
Tlie rightist press: From the very beginning, the Hong Kong Times 
framed the movement as resistance against communist rule from the very 
beginning. Clashes between students and the authorities were played up. It also 
inteipreted the movement as a serious challenge to the Communist regime. It 
gave the impression to its readers that these challenges would not be tolerated。 
Brutal suppression was expected. 
Tlie following quantitative analysis of slogans and posters reported 
by each newspapers during this period ^ helps us to understand the frames of 
these newspapers better : 
Pro- Anti- Anti-
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Cornmuni^- Mourning 
Tai Kung 4 0 0 14 
Wen Wei 5 0 0 15 
Ming Pao 13 0 0 7 
Sing Pao 20 2 0 8 
Times 25 7 3 3 
w e r e ^ ^ t T " ^丨㊀醉 reported in the six sampled newspapers from April 16，1989 to April 25,1989 
於 For example, "long live democracy； "long live freedom"; "press freedom”. 
OM 嶋 細 “ ； 、 . F O U R YEA^  
” For example, "down with communist dictatorship". 
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From the table above, we can see that both Ta Kung and Wen Wei 
were most interested in reporting slogans and posters expressing sorrow over the 
death of Hu Yaobang, This supports our qualitative analysis that the leftist press 
tried to de-politicize the movement by framing it as mourning activities. The 
statistics also shows that Sing Pao and Ming Pao are keen at reporting the 
students pro-democracy demands. It was because the movement was framed by 
the commercial press as "democratic" in nature. Hong Kong Times reported the 
most of anti-Deng and anti-Communist slogans and posters among the five 
newspapers. This clearly supports our analysis that the rightist press tried to 
frame the movement as an anti-Communist campaign. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FROM ROUTINE TO CRISIS: THE SECOND STAGE 
In this stage, the Hong Kong press gradually moved from the 
routine mode to the crisis mode. Although organizational interestes of different 
newspsapers were still the major factor in framing the movement, the influence 
of journalists，personal interests started to grow. Tlie leftist press gradually 
deviated from the official line. Framing the movement as "peaceful" and 
"patriotic’，，the leftist papers blamed the government for not listening to the 
students. The co醒erdai newspapers also shifted from their "tension" frame and 
took a clear stance favourable to the students. The sympathy of both the leftist 
and the co醒ercial newspapers with the students was shared by the Times. 
However，standing firm on its anti-Communist platform, the rightist paper was 
still more critical and straightforward in condemning the Chinese authorities, 
7.1 Key Events During the Second Stage ( April 26 to May 18 ) 
April 26 The People^s Daily editorial: ” Taking a clear and firm stand against 
r shed. editorial d/nounced the 
p c o p i ? conspiracy，a not .•…instigated by a small number of 
May 4 Students held another rally to mark the 70th anniversary of the May 
？n five hundred journalists also joiSd the rdly^ 
^ I P S ^ S 二 = thousand people gathered at Central fo 
May 13 About two thousand Beijing students decided to go on hunger-
strike until the government showed its sincerity to tSk S h 
May 14 More students joined the hunger-strike. A lot of Beijing citizens 
supported the students by donating money and m e d i S 
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May 15 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev arrived in Beijing. However 
iHs weicorm^ ceremony had to be held at the airpor i i e ^ ^ f ^ ’ 
t : ， O f th。二s Of 一 stm 
May 17 pother big march to support the students, this time joined by 
S T n ' ^ r e s and soldiers. In Hong Kong, seven thousaidpeopS 
iield a pro-democracy rally at the Victoria Park. ^ 
The Leftist Press 
Tlie student movement had entered one of its critical stages during 
this period. Step by step, the students pressed the government harder and harder 
to meet their demands. They even took the radical move to stage a hunger strike. 
The large turnout of the three marches, especially the one on May 17，clearly 
showed that the students had won the support of the mass. 
Hie leftist press sharply changed its attitude towards the movement 
during this stage. In a surprising move, it gradually deviated from the official 
stand of the Communist Party and tried to offer its own interpretation of the 
situation. The movement was At last, it 
even reached a point that both Ta Kung and Wen Wei showed their full 
recognition and support of the movement as E IQzdemo^ and patriotic. It also 
carried sensitive criticisms against the Chinese government for not listening to the 
students. The changes in the leftist press were gradual but steady. Tlie 
first hint could be detected as early as April 26 - four days after the funeral of 
Hu Yaobang. Since the student movement broke out following Hu，s death, the 
leftist press had followed the official line closely. H^e marches and 
demonstrations were interpreted as part of the mourning activities. Nevertheless, 
the ‘mourning frame，lost its validity after the funeral of Hu. It would have been 
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awkward to report the protest actions of the students, such as class boycott and 
marches, as expressing their sorrow over the late Party General Secretary 
anymore. It was at this juncture the leftist press began to break away from the 
Party line and found its own way out. 
The official People's Daily formally announced the end of all 
mourning activities two days after the funeral of Hu. In a short commentary on 
April 24, it urged the people to go back to their normal duties: 
from now on k f nZ r l ^ ' •肪 end to all the mourning activities. Our task 
Tliis commentaiy marked an end to the ‘mourning frame，of the 
official press. From then on, the student movement cannot be interpreted within 
the old context anymore. One day later, the Communist Party made known its 
new interpretation of the situation. In a famous People、Daily editorial broadcast 
by the state-owned television and radio station, it labelled the movement as a 
••conspiracy" “ instigated by a small number of people" whose aim was to “ negate 
the leadership of the Communist Party and overturn the socialist system". It 
urged the public to unite together and stand firmly against riots in order to win 
this ” serious political struggle 
Both Ta Kung and Wen Wei handled the People、Daily editorial in 
a "strange way" to show their disagreement to the new official line. Although the 
editorial was generally viewed as an important political statement of the Chinese 
Governrnem，neither Ta Kung nor Wen Wei used it as the lead story of the day. ^ 
the L S J ^ 胸胸脱d 出e resignation of Japanese Prixne Minister Noboru Takeshita as 
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ra Kung even put it in the lower part of the page. Wen Wei, on the other hand, 
placed it to the left hand side. Both of them were relatively unimportant 
locations in Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong. 
The location of the story indicated the Httle importance attached 
to it by the leftist press. Wen Wei even tried to play ck)wn the authority of the 
editorial by referring to it only as an "editorial in a Beijing newspaper" in the 
headline. ^ It was doubtless that the editorial weighed a lot less under this name 
than a ‘People's Daily editorial" which was often seen as equivalent to a 
government announcement. 
However, it was found that both leftist papers were not prepared 
to deviate completely from the official line at this point. Neither Ta Kung nor 
胸 Wei made special effort in reporting the students，reaction to the allegations. 
Students，opinion was only found in one sentence in Wen Wei, which reported 
that "some university students in Beijing think that the government have 
i n i ^ i m d M d i i l M o i ^ “ The self-defence of the students seemed to be rather 
weak as reported by Wen Wei, compared to other newspapers. According to other 
reports，the students were "nervous and shocked" ^ ； "extremely unhappy" ^ ； and 
"angrily dismissed the allegations". ^ Although both Wen Wei and Tai Kung had 
indicated that they did not like the ‘riot frame，at all, they could only criticize it 
subtly. 
2 Wen Wei Pao, April 26，1989. 
3 Ming Pao, April 26, 1989. 
4 Sing Pao, April 26, 1989. 
5 South China Morning Post, April 26, 1989. 
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On the following day ( April 27)，Wen Wei carried a feature story 
written by its Beijing correspondent Liu Ruishao. Analyzing recent events, Liu, 
for the first time since the movement began, raised doubts about the official 
interpretation: 
extent ril \d=btless that the government has exercised restraint to a large 
It can be seen that the writer had expressed his view in an 
extremely delicate style. The government stand was not criticized directly. The 
一 、 D - editorial was not even mentioned by name. It was only referred 
to as "some allegations recently". message, however, was clear. Basing his 
argument on students，remarks, the Wen Wei reporter had made a pretty strong 
case for the students that they had no intention at all to overturn Communist 
rule. What they asked for was nothing more than improvements in the countiy, 
something which should not be inconsistent with the govemmenfs aim. He also 
pointed out subtly the danger of suppression. It was indicated that any such 
‘ S S f r p ’ r i ; 2 S ! ^ 9 ’ 8 》 e s t r ^ e d and Understandable: Some Feelings About the Student Movexnenr, 
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intention would not be accepted by Chinese people all over the world. 
Subtle as it may be, but the Wen Wei reporter made an unusual 
case of contradicting the official line in the leftist press. Wen Wei Pao was soon 
joined by its leftist partner. On April 27，hundreds of thousands of Beijing 
students took part in the largest student march in China since 1919. Over one 
million Beijing citizens cheered the marchers as they walked by. The official 
Xinhua News Agency, however, reported that only thirty tho^s.nd students took 
part Apart from the march itself, Xinhua also reported that a number of 
••workers，scientists, school headmasters and cadres" had urged the students not 
to join the march in order not to be used to start a riot. 
Ta 脑g P如 started the story with the Xinhua dispatch. However, 
immediately it went on with an account by its own reporters in Beijing. 
Contradicting the Xinhua estimation that only thirty thousand students had turned 
， up, Ta Kung reporters set the figure at over one million. The report was a serious 
challenge to the creditability of the official news agency which represents the 
Party and the Government. Instead of framing the march as a riot, Ta Kung 
stressed in the lead of the story that the march was in remarkable order. ^ It also 
mentioned specifically some pro-Communist banners carried by the marchers. 
These banners, such as “ long live the Communist Party", ’，protecting the 
constitution ,’，“ supporting the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party, and ,, insisting on the socialist system"，acted as a strong dismissal against 
the government allegation that the movement was an anti-Communist conspiracy. 
Wei Pao，on the other hand, did not use the Xinhua story at 
all. It was the first time since the death of Hu Yaobang that the newspaper had 
7 Ta Kung Pao, April 28, 1989. 
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completely depended on its own correspondent in reporting such a key event 
Like TaiKun,�Wen Wei also MgMighted the pro-Communist banners. IHe "order" 
of the march was also stressed. 
On May 4，about one hundred thousand students marched again in . 
Beiiing to mark the 70th azmiversary of the May 4 Pro-democracy Movement. 
‘ Tl^ e students also took the chance to reiterate their demands. Tins time, both Ta 
一 — p a i d little attention to the official account of the Communist 
Party provided by Xinhua. Ta Kung placed the Xinhua report at the last part of 
the stoiy, preceded with a detail report by its own correspondents. Wen Wei did 
not use the Xinhua stoiy at all. 
Tlie May 4 march was the first occasion so far that both leftist 
papers had agreed with other newspapers in general on the number of 
partidpants in marches and rallies. According to Xinhua, only twenty thousand 
students took part in the march. Both Ta Kung and Wen Wei reported five times 
more: over one hundred thousand. Tl.e estimation was close to the figure . 
suggested by other newspapers, including the rightist press. « 
What was more important, however, was that for the first time the 
leftist press framed the movement as pro-democracy in nature. H^e leftist press 
so far had been veiy vague in identifying the students，goals. Although the 
movement was not reported as mourning activities an声ore during this stage, the 
democratic demands of the students were still seldom mentioned by the leftist 
press. Even in Liu Ruishao's critical article in Wen Wei which gave the clear 
signal that the leftist press disagreed to the Party Ii.e, the writer was keen to 
estimation at one hundred thousand. cnousancL The two commercial papers also put the 
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avoid the pro-democracy demands of the students. The goals of the students were 
only quoted as ” anti-corruption" and “ better education". ^ The April 27 march 
was only referred to as a " peaceful petition" without defining the aim of the 
march. TOs was no longer the case. Reporting the May 4 march, both leftist 
papers showed little hesitation in highlighting the political nature of the 
movement. 
T^a Kung，for example, pointed this out clearly in the lead of the 
story: 
恥/z Wei Pao, on the other hand, printed in detail the " May 4th 
Manifesto" drafted by the steering organization of the student movement. 
student I L : 二 ： t isthe biggest 
extension and continuation of thp \aJ a ^ ， 1919. It is also the 
histoiy. It is e x t r e ^ l U y t ^ ^ f f i t W ‘施vement . It was unprecedented in 
The student organization which drafted this manifesto was 
denounced as "illegal" by the government ever since it caxne into existence. 
However，its authority was not challenged by Wen Wei in any way. No quotation 
‘ _ ^ei Pao, April 27, 1989. 
Tai Kung Pao, May 5, 1989. 
u Wen Wei Pao, May 5，1989. 
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marks were used to de-credit its claims. Words which imply doubts, such as 
"claimed" or “ so-called", were not found. Instead, more positive expressions such 
as ” pointed out “，"stressed" and "believed" were used. All these served to 
legitimize the students' notion as a "patriotic pro-democracy movement". 
Another thing worth pointing out was that Ta Kung had reported 
for the first time the slogans criticizing government leaders including Deng 
Xiaoping. Among other banners carried by the students in the march on May 4, 
7b Kung mentioned in particular one claiming that “ Old man politics should 
come to an end". The criticism was clearly directed against Deng and other 
powerful old men in the communist countiy. 
However，neither Tai Kung nor Wen Wei was prepared to side with 
the students at this point. Although the leftist press had begun to offer its own 
interpretation of the movement, the official line was still reported in a prominent 
way by both papers. One illustrating example of this can be found on April 27， 
the day Wen Wei carried Liu Ruishao's feature story which subtly criticized the 
People's Daily editorial. On the same day, in fact, both TaKung and Wen Wei led 
with reports on Party meetings in Beijing and Shanghai. The theme of these 
meetings，contradictory to Liu's analysis, was to reinforce the "riot allegation"。 
The leftist press did not try to resolve the conflict between the two different 
interpretations. Nor was it prepared to give up one of them and stand by the 
other. It just presented both of them simultaneously and left the choice to its 
readers. 
What the leftist papers were advocating, in fact, was a peaceful 
resolution. As pointed out clearly by Liu Ruishao's article on April 27，the best 
that could be done was that" all parties concerned should take a more sensible 
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approach towards the movement."'' 
As a result of this approach, "sensible moves" by both parties were 
also played up by the leftist press. We have mentioned above that the hard-line 
April 26 People's Daily editorial was not treated as important news by both Ta 
肪d Wen Wei although it clearly represented the official view. However, the 
more "sensible" remarks by Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang were treated 
totally differently. Speaking to a number of foreign delegates attending the 
Annual Meeting of the Asia Development Bank on May 4，Zhao said that " what 
is needed most now is to stay calm, be sensible, restrain and keep everything in 
order. We have to solve the problem by democratic and legal means". Both Ta 
肪d Wen Wei reported these remarks as the lead story of the day although 
the huge student march took place the same day. ITie march was the lead story 
in all other newspapers in Hong Kong that day. 
About two thousand students staged a hunger strike on May 13. It 
was the most radical move by the students so far. Both Ta Kung and Wen Wei 
played down this story. The story was found only in the lower part of the page 
in both newspapers. Ta Kung even trivialized the event by scaling down the 
number of hunger-strikers from two thousand to "five to six hundred". ^ 
Hie lead story in both leftist papers that day was again "sensible" 
remarks from Zhao Ziyang. Zhao, talking to workers in Beijing this time, urged 
the students to stay calm in order not to jeopardize the forthcoming Sino-Soviet 
summit. Again, this arrangement was found to be unique in the leftist press. On 
the same day, most of other newspapers led with the hunger-strike stoiy. 
12 Wen Wei Pao, April 27, 1989. 
^ Tai King Pao, May 14，1989. 
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I 香 港 中 文 大 學 固 當 你 藏 當 
However，the "sensible frame" of the leftist press began to shift as 
the hunger strike continued. Government officials met with student leaders on 
May 14 but the meeting ended with no result. The over one thousand hunger-
strikers in Tiananmen Square vowed to cany on their struggle until their 
demands were met by the government. They had refused to take any food for 
over twenty hours. Some of the students began to feel sick and were rushed to 
hospitals. The huger strike finally became the lead story in the leftist press on 
May 15. Ta Kung showed clearly in its report that it worried about the health of 
those who took part in the hunger-strike: 
tn hncn.f "/“T^octors and nurses said that over ten students fainted and were sent 
=hospital. It IS very tot m Beijing during daytime. The temperature goZ J S 
^ r ^ ' m ^ degrees. The nights are 腿 c h cooler. The temperature drop二 
s t d e m s � e s . iLliimLdiffiMt to imagine how toueh the s i t i i ^ . n f l f g l o 
Ta 他叹，s sympathetic approach to the students hinted the complete 
frame shift of the leftist press three days later. On May 17，over one million 
people marched in Beijing to support the students. Tliose who took part in the 
march came from all walks of life, including workers, cadres, policemen, soldiers 
and journalists. By then, the students had been hunger striking for four days. 
Over one thousand of them needed to be treated in the hospital. Yet, there was 
no sign that the government would agree to the students' demand for a "open 
dialogue". 
Both leftist papers gave up their "sensible frame" at this point. As 
discussed above, the leftist press had tried to play up rational moves by both 
sides，giving the impression that it was the responsibility for both the government 
14 Ta Kung Pao, May 15, 1989. 
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and the students to stay calm and reasonable in order to end the chaos. However, 
this theme was not found anymore in the reports on the march. Hie way the 
march was reported this time indicated that both Ta Kung and Wen Wei had re-
interpreted the situation. Instead of tiying to see things from both side, the leftist 
began to take a firm stand to side with the students. 
Unlike reporting the last two marches (April 27 and May 5)，both 
ra Kung and Wen Wei showed no hesitation in stressing the huge support for the 
students this time. Wen Wei, calling the students "patriotic"，highlighted this point 
in the headline of the story: 
patriotic studJnt?- ' ' ' " " " " " People marched in Beijing t^upport the 
Ta 份 耶 did the same in the headline and went on with a colourful 
description: 
T.. c � e r one million people from all walks of life marched to the 
Ti^anmen Square today to support the students who • .till 彳n hiirw.r .tWl.. 
Spontaneous civil marches like this was seldom found in the history of C W 
tmin .t S.^n 彳2广ands of university students from Tianjin arrived in Beijing by 
S V ？e morning. As soon as they got off the train, they marched to 
t ^ Tiananmen Square to support the students who took part in the hunSrstrike 
they got off the train. From that moment on, the flow c/people 二二Tn? 二 £ 
= a r e had never stopped. Hiey came from all walks of wgorke^ s 
巧re》journalists scholars and tens of thousands of middle s c h o K = ， 
I crowds of people marched into the Square like rivers tan to t e 
ra Kung revealed how it interpreted these scenes clearly in another 
feature story on the same day: 
^ ^en Wei Pao, May 18，1989. 
Ta Kung Fao, May 18，1989. 
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…The goal of these one million people is very clear. It is to get rid 
^oC^lTPtion; to � for democracy and freedom and to press for political 
, i n t nf n.i ..l^^ost of the time since the hunger strike began, there had been 
a lot of onlookers in the Square.".But today, the Square was dominated by 
-ppo^ers ofthe s^dents. Serious and enthusiastic faces can be seen everywhere 
They knew what they had come for. Hiey were not playing around.... 
…Th，e people were not a "small number of people". Thev are not 
fjiose who want to have riots. They are all honest "lao bai sing" (ordinary people). 
This article made one point clear. The movement, at this point, 
had gained the full recognition and approval of the leftist press. It was seen as 
a righteous mass movement to press for freedom and democracy. It was the 
duty of the government to listen to the views of the ”lao bai sing". The official 
• allegation that the movement was a riot was openly and clearly rejected. 
As a result of the frame shift, anti-government sentiments among 
the people was no longer avoided in the reports of the leftist press. For the first 
time in many years, slogans and banners criticizing government leaders had 
escaped the tight censorship in the leftist papers. Banners such as “ Step down, 
Deng Xiaoping ’，； " Step down, Li Peng ； “ Xiaoping, we all support you as a 
bridge player" and “ Xiaoping, people in Sichuan welcome you home" were 
reported by both Ta Kung and Wen Wei. Although these banners had not been 
played up by the leftist papers as by some other newspapers ！8，the fact that they 
were reported represented a major change in the newspapers' attitude. All these 
1 7 脇 
heacL^"^ English newspapers in Hong Kong, for example, highlighted the anti-Deng sentiment in the 
= 二 = 1 : / = : t C o t o ， 一 to quit as demonstrations grow." T^e HongKong S 一 • 
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banners can be seen as ,, counter-revolutionary" by the Chinese government. Yet 
they were described as “ speaking the people's mind “ by the leftist press. ^^  
The support of Hong Kong people for the movement also got 
prominent coverage in the leftist press. On the same day of the big march in 
Beijing，about seven thousand people in Hong Kong gathered at the Victoria 
Park to back up the Beijing students. The rally was reported by the leftist press 
in a positive way such as describing it as" in a high spirit"; “ widely supported “ 
and “ moving" •如 
Both leftist papers reported in detail the speeches delivered in the 
rally. Even the remarks made by Sezto Wah, an "unfriendly" legislative councillor 
to the leftist, were reported in a positive way: 
Sezto Wah, the President of the Professional Teachers' Association 
was welcomed by a d w — rxo^. He said that demands of the beijbg S S 
二 : r a t i o na l and sensible. All Chinese people should stand up o l ) 二 the 
Chinese government back to sense. He said that the "riot" was actually star^fd by 
^ose m po^^e^ who refused to listen to the students. He vowed to sup^S t^^ 
students^th all his strength. When he nn.H. th彳《rem.rk. t h .爪 1 
so hard thnt it sounded ItVp thnnH^Wx^ ^ 21 ^ 叩p丨抓nen 
The views of Sezto Wah was seldom reported so positively by the 
leftist press. The special treatment clearly indicates that the leftist press had 
shifted its stands considerably from that of the Party. 
The two leftist papers also gave prominent coverage to appeals 
which urged the government to soften its stand: a clear indication that this was 
what the newspapers wanted as well. On May 17, a number people and groups 
19 Tai Kung Pao, May 18，1989. 
^ Wen Wei Pao, May 18，1989. 
Ta King Pao. May 18, 1989. 
;67 
openly suggested it was the responsibility of the Chinese government to hold " 
sincere ” dialogues with the students in order to solve the problem. Some of them 
even sent telexes to Beijing to express their views. Their demands were clearly 
supported by the leftist press. Although all these appeals shared the same theme, 
they were reported by both Ta Kung and Wen Wei as separate stories. Not 
following news editing practices to put relevant stories together, both leftist 
papers placed the "appeal" stories in different parts of the page. It gave the 
impression that this is the unanimous voice of all people in Hong Kong. 
7.3 The Commercial Press 
The student movement was framed as "tensions" and "conflicts" by 
both Ming Pao and Sing Pao in the first stage. Like the leftist press, the 
commercial press shifted this frame during the second stage. Although the process 
of frame shift was quite different between Ming Pao and Sing Pao, both of them 
eventually stood firmly on the side of the students and blamed the Chinese 
Government for being tough and stubborn. 
It is found that Sing Pao continued to frame the story in terms of 
conflicts and tensions in the beginning of this stage. As a continuation of the 
"tension frame"，the People，s Daily editorial on April 26 was reported by Sing Pao 
as a hint of high-handed suppression. The tension was highlighted in the headline 
of the story: 
TTnh奶nx, R � e CCP issued tough warning against student demonstrations' 
Unhappy Beijing students feared to be nrelude of prr^ct. “ ^ 
Sing Pao, April 26, 1989. 
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Sing P如 did not cany the full text of the editorial but 
dedicated most part of the story to the tension theme. According to Sing Pao, 
students in Beijing were very nervous about the situation: 
a hint th.t th广;"U^^^versity students in Beijing were afraid that the editorial was 
saS lh t t a Inf T r e n t would start arresting students shortly. Student sources 
of ？lam cloth policemen were found in the campuses Some 
S^rletSd ad been followed ( by detectives )• It was also suspecteHat t = 
=Dl》f5bCeO;S=etectives m student organizations. The 38th regiment of the 
s ^ beration ^ m y , originally stationed in Hebei, was also called into the 
capital. The atmosphere in university campuses is tense and uncomfortable…“ 
The special attention to the tense atmosphere was found to be quite 
unique in Sing Pao, Ming Pao, on the other hand, reported the students only as 
saying that ’，it was a severe political struggle ” ^ without going any further. 
In fact, Ming Pao seemed to have given up the "tension frame" since 
the publishing of the April 26 People、Daily editorial. Like the leftist press, 
instead，it shown an inclination to adopt a "problem-solving approach", playing 
up "sensible" rather than ”radical" elements of the movement. 
On April 26，Ming Pao carried a report on students trying to 
appeal for support. Although it was reported in the lead of the story that,’ a lot 
of people donated money to support the students", it was another theme that was 
stressed in the headline: 
”Workers said they would Tint go on stWkP to support the students." 
忍 Ibid. 
^ Ming Pao, April 26, 1989. 
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On the same day, Ming Pao also reported exclusively that the 
Students，Union of the Shenzhen University had expressed "reservations" towards 
class boycott. Tlie story was not found in all other sampled newspapers, not even 
in the leftist press. 
"Peacefulness" rather than "tension" was the theme of Ming Pao,s 
coverage on the two marches in Beijing on April 27 and May 4. Ming Pao，s 
report on the April 27 march that, contrary to reports in the first stage, the 
newspaper was now more interested in harmony than conflict. TOs theme was 
stressed in the first sentence of the story: 
H.Vth f . r t .顶e biggest spontaneous student march in Communist China since 
二 birth forty years ago took place peacefully as both the strident, and the nnlirp 
had exercised high de^rpp. of self-restraint 万 P 職 
In fact, peacefulness was the theme not only found in the lead but 
throughout the whole stoiy in Ming Pao. Instead of describing in detail how 
students broke through police blockades, the Ming Pao reporter had concentrated 
Ms effort in portraying the "harmony" among the students, the police and the 
Beijing citizens: 
rr^ traffic came to a standstill as the students marched by 
However，nobody was mmplaininp about this. Hiose who were caught in the jam 
™ happy to have wi'itip^.^h such a m.rrh — e 声 
. "-The enthusiasm and unity of the students also dissolved the 
s'SJ^nrnnt of the PoHcemen to their assignments,...Although m c T p c S e m t 
still l o ^ senous, a number of their colleagues had applauded to the studeJs 
Some of them even shook hands with the people. ^ smaents. 
芯 Ming Pao, April 28, 1989. 
^ Ming Pao, April 28, 1989. 
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It can be argued that "peacefulness" was actually the characteristic 
of the march. Ming Pao simply had it reflected in its report. This is true. But let 
us see how Sing Pao handled the story. StiU adopting the "tension" frame, the 
march was reported by Sing Pao as taking place in ” extremely tense 
atmosphere" and was "lucky" not to have serious confrontations. ^ Five of the 
seven paragraphs of the story described how students broke through police 
barricades time after time. There were several times, according to Sing Pao, that 
it was very close to violence. Even when the march ended peacefully, it was 
described by Sing Pao as being lud^ "to avoid the once imminent bloody 
suppression".功 
Tlie May 4 march was also framed differently between Ming Pao 
and Sing Pao. Teacefulness" was again stressed by Ming Pao while covering the 
march on May 4. The theme was highlighted in the headline of the story: 
class today. ^ ^ ^ ^ 咖 ^ march on May 4 ended peacefully. Students go back to 
In the lead of the stoiy, the Ming Pao reporter concluded that the 
marchers were not "seriously obstructed" by the police. ^ He also reported that 
the May 4 march was even "smoother" than the previous one on April 27. ^^  
彻 g Pao, on the other hand, still framed the march within the 
context of tension and confrontation. Instead of stressing the march as taking 
^ Sing Pao, April 28, 1989. 
a Ibid. 
^ Ming pao, May 5，1989. 
劝 Ming Pao, May 5，1989. 
Ibid. 
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place in peace, Sing Pao reported in the lead of the story that there had been 
"fierce confrontations" nothing "unhappy" had happened. ^^  Like reporting the 
previous march, Sing Pao showed a deep interest in describing how the students 
broke through police blockades time after time. ^ 
However，like the leftist press, it is found that both Sing Pao and 
脑g P恥 shifted its frame on the movement after the government showed no 
intention to open dialogue with the students to end the hunger strike. Reporting 
the march on May 17，both newspapers emphasised the huge support the students 
won and blamed the government of procrastinating the resolution of the crisis. 
Like the leftist press, both Ming Pao and Sing Pao stressed the 
popularity of the movement in the headline of the stoiy: 
户肌 J^ol j严g banners written ” millions of soldiers and civilians with one 
heart ； workers and the liberation army joined the march. ^ 
彻 g 尸肌 The Beijing pro-democracy movement seethed with excitement. 
l^armers and workers actively involved.於 ， 
Although the two commercial newspapers differed in framing the 
two previous marches, they showed remarkable resemblance in reporting this one. 
The tone of the story, usually set in the first few paragraphs, was almost identical 
in the two papers: 
脑一•• Over one million people from all walks of life took to the 
^^ Sing Pao, May 5, 1989. 
二 0 = 1 ^ ; 》 二 二 o h ^ S t ( 1 ; 去 S t H ? ; ； B . 5 s . . C . ) . on 
Ming Pao, May 18，1989. 
^ Sing Pao, May 18, 1989 
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streets yesterday to express their concern and support for the 
students. They have written a new chapter in the Chinese history. 
• Jliose who joined the march included workers, farmers 
^t^Uect^s，journalists and party cadres working in government 
bo^es. The most special among them are over one thousand 
soldiers of the People's Liberation Army. 
Some cadres working in the Foreign Ministry said the 
not to take part in the march. But 
they maintained that modem Chinese people should no longer 
meekly submit to oppression and no longer silent. 
彻 容 户 卯 ： ^ …er one million people took to the streets on Wednesday 
lHose took part in the march came from all walks of life including 
二orkers，fymers, intellectuals journalists, employees of government 
bodies and even primary school students. 
nf f^lj thousand staff of the General Logistic Department 
of the PLA also joined the march. 
The marchers, holding various banners and flags, sang and 
shouted for democracy and freedom on the way. They composed 
a moving scene. ^ 
(Two paragraphs describing the details of the banners) 
^ o n g the marchers were workers from different factories and 
membe^ of the official Chinese Workers' Union. They said that it 
was no longer time to remain silent .…… 
Like the leftist press, the enthusiasm ofthe mass to take part in the 
movement was seen by the commercial papers as due to the stubbornness of the 
Chinese government. Ming Pao stressed this point clearly in a feature story the 
same day. Calling the movement a "bitter gourd" to the Chinese government, 
the writer clearly blamed the authorities for allowing the crisis to develop: 
” g o v e r n m e n t should have swallowed the bitter seeds last week It refused 
Now, they have to swallow a huge bitter sourd “ THp^p。二 Zr^nX. a 1 
professor when he witnessed th/big SSl/on ^ J ay l l _ ^ d e by a 
....The number of slogans and banners criticizing Chinese leaders increa s^ed 
sigmncantly m yesterday's march. The number and thi directness 3 ? 『 e s = = n ? 
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二ere striking. ...^le people held these banners because they were angry at the 
^ehictance to meet the students. Everywhere in B � 二 = 
I Z S l ^ government as "irresponsible", ,, rathl'die'd than 
The story ended with these remarks: 
According to a scholar of the Chinese Institute of Social Science 
s^ubbo^ ；fe Chinese authorities is, the later they : o S S b e T S 
J^th n L f ? smdents; the greater the loss it has to face. He said, “ I agree 
【 0 = and ^ the march. It said: The anchor of this country 
二otten and needs u^ediate repair. Cut deep into bones to remove the virS 
t h i rH ' t 1 too late. If the leaders are, still tn … 、 僅 Z T u l ^ ^ 
-the student move,mem • develon into . 。 外 顺 e r ^ ^ n t J J Z ^ 
7.4 The Rightist press 
As expected, the Hong Kong Times stuck to its anti-Communist 
stance in this stage. The three marches during this period were framed by the 
T i鹏 as people's resistance against communist rule. 
As a result of the "anti-Communist" frame, the People's Daily 
editorial on April 26 was portrayed in a negative way by the Times. We have 
pointed out that the leftist papers and Ming Pao did not care much about the 
students，reaction to the editorial. Sing Pao, on the other hand, stressed only the 
tension of the situation. The Times, adopting a totally different approach， 
interpreted the editorial completely form the studenfs angle. 
Unlike Sing Pao which reported that the students feared to be 
suppressed, the Times stressed in the headline of the stoiy that the editorial was 
the prelude of iron fist suppression", and that "the students dismissed 
^ Ming Pao, May 18，1989. 
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it (the editorial) as wrongly labelling them." - Hie story did not carry much of 
the editorial but mostly the angry reactions from the students. This was 
highlighted in the lead of the story: 
et^  d + U e CCP issued a strongly worded statement on Tuesday, accusing 
the student movement of being a “ severe political struggle" against the a二f 
agains tsocmhsm. SUidents leaders called a press confe^nce at once. HieT^ked 
the "anti-Party label". The confrontation betwLnthe 
students and the Party was sharpened. Hie atmosphere was very tense. 
Instead of reporting the students fear of arrests, the Times story 
quoted a student as saying " they dare not (arrest anybody). There are too many 
of us." 
Tlie march on April 27 was also reported under this theme. The 
T i鹏 did not stress the "peacefulness" (as in Ming Pao) nor the "tension" (as 
in Sing Pao). Instead，it praised the students，courage to stand up against threats 
of suppression in the headline of the story: 
Se loTV^o s^rifice the二Ives in bloodshed to fight for democracy and 
marched in Beijing; millions of people 
The march was framed by the Times within the same context: 
authorities I S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ h e f m war^inps and siippr.^ eion^- of the communist 
，r ^?o，and students from over 40 universities in Beijing broke 
^hrougli police blockades time after time and triumphnmlv marched t ^ h e 
TJanan^en Square. The students were people w t 
驗n，dec』after t L 
l iTvO^^^^^^^ big demonstration on 
•"A student leader proudly declared through loudspeakers, ,’ We 
^ Hong Kong Times, April 26, 1989. 
^ Hong Kong Times, April 28, 1989. 
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foYgt/^^ie^tory today. The histoiy will not forget us. Hie people will not 
It can be seen that the march was interpreted by the Times as the 
victory of the people's power to resist communist suppression. Adopting a similar 
theme，the march on May 4 was reported by the Times as a united effort of 
Chinese people all over the world to protest against Communist dictatorship. This 
theme was clearly spelled out in the lead of the story: 
150 thousand students made a solemn statement in the Tiananmen 
^quare In the meantime, students in Taiwan, Hong Kong Macau c Z S . 
S r = ， / j S ; a i ， f 叫 Changsh，Wuha；, H i o l u l u g ’ B = a n \ G = g = u 
l^ aris also hold rallies to press the CCP to speed up political reform Thev also 
aslc the communist to value knowledge and science ey also 
In order to highlight the anti-Communist theme, the Times reporter 
skilfully linked the march up with the portrait of Dr. Sun Yatsen erected in the 
Tiananmen Square: 
Dr Sun Y.t.Jn ？h?严，！f stfents held a large rally in front of th. pnrtr.it . f 
4 M.nLTt ^ ounder of the Republic of China. Hiey read out the May 
4 Manifesto, vowing to carry on with the May 4 spirit to fight for dei^ocrrc^ 
science，human rights and a good legal system. g 此mocracy， 
. ‘』…"A 产dent leader made a speech at the beginning of the rallv He 
二n:ed out that the aim of the rally was to mark the 70th aniJe?二。f，忍.!^^ 
i ^ ^ S r r t well as to protest against the government for suppS^ng S i i S 
movement He quoted a famous saying from Dr. Sun, ” Hie revXioVfs not S 
accomplished; comrades, keep on fighting." ^ revolution is not yet 
$ Ibid. 
劝 Times, May 5, 1989, 
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The march on May 17 was again reported by the Times within an 
anti-government framework. Apart from stressing the participation of cadres and 
soldiers as other newspapers did, the Times played up the anti-govemment 
sentiments among the demonstrators. This was highlighted in the headline of the 
Times story: 
^ ^ e e million workers farmers，soldiers and students marched in Beijing. 
thCrhrgr/hfTl^l^ ^ the resignation of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng ；an'g 
Unlike the commercial newspapers which concentrated on 
describing how the march was supported by workers and soldiers, the Times used 
the first few paragraphs of the stoiy to report the anti-govemment slogans in the 
march: 
t i J I ^ e third paragraph) As the top communist leaders dare not face 
tje students and refused to withdraw the April 26 People，s Daily editorial 
二 e S j ^ P S S ； t h e i r discontent to the Lhorities； 
n。l S p g College of foa l Mining asked the authorities to" stop the 
『 a = d t h a S r 械horn a knife". H^e Chinese Medical InsLte 
S ^ e r i e d , Wn v fO refuse 工。rescue the dying students should be 
L = ， s from the Capital Steel Mill said that “ it is stupid 
n w 巧ere are also slogans pointing at Deng Xiaoping such as ( 
Descriptions of the slogans go on for two paragraphs) …（ 
It can be seen that the Times has singled out the challenge 




In short, there was a gradual convergency in the framing of the 
movement by different newspapers during this stage. All sampled newspapers 
blamed the government for not responding positively to the students demands. 
One important development during this stage was the deviation of the leftist 
papers from the official line. Hiey joined the commercial papers in supporting 
the students in their reports. However, both the leftist and the commercial papers 
were not ready to put too much emphasis on the anti-government sentiments 
among the people. The Hong Kong Times was still the only newspaper which 
played up this theme during this stage. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONSENSUS IN CRISIS: THE THIRD STAGE 
8.1 Key Events During the Third Stage ( May 19 to June 8 ) 
May 19 Premier Li Peng addressed ten thousand cadres in Beijing He 
announced that troops had been called into Beijing to "restore the 
二der of the capital. Hundreds of thousands of gseijing 5 L 二 
IjJocked the roads around Beijing to stop the troops from moving 
May 20 Martial law was imposed on the city of Beijing. 
施 y 21 ==，people marched in Hong Kong to support the Beijing 
June 3 Troops succeeded in entering Beijing. 
June 4 Troops recaptured the Tiananmen Square by force, firing at 
civilians and student who tried to stop them. 呂 
8.2 Framing The Crisis 
This was the crisis stage. As predicted by our hypothesis, personal 
inclinations of the journalists became a more important factor in framing the 
movement. As a result, different types of newspapers, regardless of their different 
political background, converged in the framing of the situation during this stage. 
The massacre on June 4 was seriously condemned by all newspapers regardless 
of their organizational interests. To avoid redundancy, I just quote some most 
illustrating examples below. 
A. The Mam'a] T^w 
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Li Peng's speech on May 19 was the prelude of the imposition of 
martial law one day later. In order to indicate their disapproval of U Peng's 
speecli，all the sampled newspapers reported the people's resistance in a 
prominent and positive way: 
Ta “ At aboutdeven o'clock, people knew that the troops was 
£oing to move m They went to the streets one after another. Hiere 
crowds of people standing all along Changan Avenue 
road in order to 
工二 m 瓜 The people remarked "the 
.More and more people gathered around . Thev were enr.a.H 
想 二 、 A student of the Central CoUege of Crafts and 
她 said The student movement rnnnpt be sep^rpt^H fmm th^ 
Beiiin. .nd • whole r h L 
f , r T T wh。they are r.nnot .o . . . in . t th. .-."^TT； 
do that ft wil] not he.rP.pt.H 
The people must support pnH protect thP 什 ’ ， i 
胸 臉 . ^ “ old Ifdy said to the soldiers in tears, “ If vou insist in 
-People crowded in the street and shouted rhythmically " PLA 
，P+ef ie ; hoij the trucks, protect the students," Some of 
them shouted so loudly that they cracked their voice.】 
M^zg Pao: “ Bering citizens went to the streets spontaneously after having 
istened to the speech of Li Peng. They waited at the main a S 
to the city to block the incoming troopi Hundreds of a 4 y tm£ 
LTnfr^^^f in crowds of people all night. Students .sw.n . . 
”rdmaiT citizens in t.^r^ 卿 , d the solHi.r. tn r.f^ain from pn— 
to suppress the snider^ ^ 
, ' ； ^ ! 气hu Fuan, many people, led by an old lady, lay down 
Z ' t ’ 产 虹 approached. A woman ciimLd up 
one of the trucks and shouted to the soldiers. “ Kids, do not Hn 
1 Ta Kung Pao, May 20, 1989. 
2 Wen Wei Pao, May 20, 1989. 
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anything to harm the students. Don^t be a criminnl fn hktnry “ ^ 
Sing 尸卯： Troops approached the city of Beijing in all directions this 
moramg. In Tiananmen Square, two hundred thousand stnHpTiK ^nH 
countless supporters hnve already prepared for n tougher chnlle.ntyp. 
to come. 4 “ ^ 
Ti贈: '•‘ Women lay down on the roads. Thev said thnt the armv tmrH 
had to run over their bodies to move rm. Snmp people even cut the 
tyre of the trucks with knives..…The people shouted. “ pennlp/Q 
army do not beat up the people". The ntmosphere wp^s both tPn.P 
and moving. ^ 
All these reports emphasised one point: the decision to mobilize 
troops against the students was unrighteous. All citizens in Beijing were on the 
side of the students. These people, among them many were women and old men, 
were prepared to sacrifice even their lives to protect the students. The message 
conveyed by these reports needs no further elaboration. 
This theme also applied to reports on the following day, when 
martial law was formally imposed. Reporting the situation of the Chinese capital 
under martial law the first time in forty years, all of the five sampled newspapers 
concentrated on how the people were determined to resist the disreputable move. 
This theme was highlighted in the headline on page one: 
Ta Kung: Workers formed death squad to protect the students.‘ 
3 Ming Pao, MaY 21,1989. 
4 Sing Pao, May 20, 1989. 
5 Hong Kong Times, May 30, 1989. 
6 Ta Kung Pao, May 21，1989. 
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PFen Wei: ne people were angiy about the martial law; hundreds nf 
thousands of citizens sfoppin^ troops ^ 一 
M叹？ao: Millions gathered at Tiananmen Square despite threats of 
suppression. 
&>2容 Pao: Martial lawimposed in Beijing; The studenf. .nH .he pennl. vnwpH 
to fi^ht to fhe very end. — 
T鹏： Ml the people vowed to protect the sfiHpnt. with thpir hn山•卯 
The attitude of the Hong Kong press towards the situation may be 
best summed up in a feature story of Wen Wei Pao on May 20. Summing up the 
recent developments, the Wen Wei reporter wrote: 
nnnnw “ � w � found in recent days that the student movement had won 
『op， r support among the people. The will of the people was very clear Zs 
of people blockingVroads in oTder" k^ep 
me troops out of Beijing. These scenes were moving. Is calling in the trooDs 
gmethin营 the people want ？ Does it accord with the demand^f S i f p e ^ ? ^ 
This IS what should be seriously thought about."« e People / 
B. The Marches 
One million people marched in Hong Kong on May 21 to support 
the Beijing students. No significant difference can be detected in different types 
of newspapers. M J y ^ a m p l e s newsp.p.r. . w the then., nf t h . ⑴ … 
m s two-fold: to protest over the imposition of •rWc^i tn drniinii 
Premier Li Peng to step Hnwn 
The commercial papers also did not hesitate in reporting the anti-
U Peng sentiment in the march. Describing the rally as "millions of people 
7 Wen Wei Pao, May 21，1989. 
8 Wen Wei Pao, 1989 
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shouting in anger", ^ Ming Pao reported in the lead of the story that the " Happy 
Valley Stadium became the histnncn] venue in which Hon^ Kong people 
expressed their support for the Beiiing stiideiit. and shouted th^ir demands for 
Li Peng to step down." i。Sing Pao，on the other hand, started the stoiy with the 
headline “ The largest ever march in HK; People shouted /Li Pen^ r Hnwn" ^ 
The anti-Li sentiment was highlighted. The rightist Hong Kong Times had played 
up the anti-government elements of the movement from the beginning. It did the 
same this time. What is interesting is that the Times' headline and story was not 
more "anti-Communist" than the commercial papers anymore.'' 
The two leftist papers also did not hesitate to report slogans and 
speeches criticizing and humiliating Li Peng in the story. Wen Wei Pao, for 
example，quoted a speaker as saying ,, if Li Peng still has some senses, he 
should knee down before the portrait of the late Premier Zhou Enlai, his step 
father. The only thing Li Peng can do is to resign." ^^  Ta Kung Pao, apart from 
reporting anti-Li criticisms, published a photograph of a blind man holding a 
banner written “ Li Peng, what are you talking about ？ ‘ ‘ 
9 Ming Pao, May 22, 1989. 
Ibid. 
^^ Sing Pao, May 22, 1989. 
叩 二 r ? 工 he^a—e of Ae M story was: “ Millions of stndents and citizens marched to Happy Valley 
^ppor^the Beijmg stiidents;Down with Li Peng." The story started with these descriptio^ S o ^ of 
二 n g Kong people c^k to the streets to support the Beijing students. They shouted, ” d o Z ^ ^ T ^ . n J 
. 结 r - Cheered 止em on t.e ；.恥y applauded 二 二 g 
Wen Wei Pao，May 22, 1989. 
14 Ta Kung Pao, may 22, 1989. 
;33 
Yet, unlike the commercial and the rightist papers, Neither Tai 
nor Wen Wei stressed it in the headline. Nevertheless, the reservations of 
the leftist press, if there was still any, totally disappeared two days later. 
Reporting another huge rally in Beijing on May 23, both Wen Wei and Ta Kung 
stressed the demands for Li Peng to resign as the major goal of the march. TTiis 
theme was spelled out in the headlines without reservations this time: 
7b Kung: Staff of central government organs joined the march; concentrating 
on asking Ti Peng to step Hnwn ^^  ^ 
恥72 Wei: Mffions of people marched in Beijing demanding Ti Pp，tn , 
Interestingly, the headline of the ultra-right Times was almost the 
same: 
:M严0|is of civilians marched in Beijing; demanding the abolition of 
martial law; unanimously asked Li Peng to resign." 口 
C. The Mass^ c^re. 
PLA troops eventually broke through the blockades of the 
people on the night June 3. They fired at civilians on their way and succeeded 
in recovering the Tiananmen Square before the dawn of June 4. All Hong Kong 
newspapers, regardless of their background, unanimously condemned the 
massacre in their editorials. In their reports, they did not refrain themselves from 
making their stands known. 
^ Ta Kung Pao, May 24，1989. 
16 Wen Wei Pao, May 24，1989. 
Hong Kong Times, May 24, 1989. 
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Ta Kung 
Headline: Bloodshed in Tiananmen Square; A Rare Tragedy Since this 
Republic was Founded. 
Jhis DayWm Be Long Remembered in Histoiy. People Burst into 
^ears as TJey Saw the Horrifying Scene. The People Can't Help 
Asking: Who Has Betrayed the People? ^ 
Story: The Chinese Liberation Army, supported by armoured vehicles and strong 
power, overcame students and dtiVp.m who did not h^ve anv we抓nm 
1 He troops recover the Tiananmen Square and forced the people, nnt nf 
the square of the peoplp ^ ^ — 
Wen Wei 
Headline: Tragedy In Tlie Capital Amid The 40th Anniversary of the 
j^epublic: Troops Fired Fiercely To Force Hieir Way To The 
Tianaimen Square. The Blood of Hundreds of People Dyed the 
I en Mile Long Changan Avenue in Red. 
Sto": Forty years s」•聽 the ]iheratioTi of Chin., th. Ph.nese Amw fir.H。t 
civiliansfor the first time last night It was known that at least 35 people 
were killed and over two hundred were injured. '' ^ 
Mim Pao 
He她ine: The Mass Was Bloodily hv the Amnv. Over Three 
Thousand Were Killed or Injured In Army Shootout. 
Story: Li Peng Governing yesterday ordered the troops to invade the 
r 二 a ^ r I ' ^ T f - ^ e f my kept firing at the people. Countless civilians 
wer; hit by bullets. Both extremely .nary .nH 叫 the people severely 
condemned the government.如 ^ ^^^ 
Sing Pan 
Headline: ；^tally iTihiimnri Bloody Massacre. Armoured Vehicles Rushing 
iiirough. Soldiers Shooting Crazily. The People Fell One By One 
Story: Tens of thousands of soldiers last night invaded the Tiananmen Square 
from all directions, finng at civilians who stood in their way The 
government has proniised thnt there will nnt be blood.hpH TW ；;; 
Ta Kung Pao, June 4，1989. 
Wen Wei Pao, June 4，1989. 
^ Ming Pao, June 4，1989. 
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e were killed: sevens】 hundreds wptp iniured The H^arl 
of Bering. People rushed for life. 
Times 
H e 暴 e : ^ e Comn i im i s t A r m y Recovered the S q u n r . hy ！^⑴；〒 The 
S wT^h ？eir Best To Stop l l ie Troops; Over Two nSkdred 
were Jailed or Injured. 
Story: ...When the army mtruded into the Square, the student broadcaster urged 
h? peop e m the Square to stay calm. One student said," The 二 n S 
s tryinMo kill ? _ e d aVili叩；in ‘ W . I ； , . 口 、 : ; 二 
comparahle to that of Hi.tl户r ” ^ k 眞 酬 e i u 
One can fairly argue that all Hong Kong newspapers interpreted 
the situation in a similar way simply because they were all reporting the same 
fact. However, the facts can be interpreted in a totally different way: 
Bf如g，June 4) According to a spokesman of the People's 
^erat丨on ^ y the situation in Beijing had gone worse since yesterday 
S ^ c Z ^ i f ted byasmallnumber of people has turned into IcounteT 
ha7aidn。rHecr•.彻譲丫，back up by Beijing citizens and 
^ e fw ^ ecisive measures to suppress the revolt At about 
0 dock this mormng, troops were stationed in the Square. Tlie 
students and other people in the Square were evacuated. ^ 
D. After The IU^k^^mp 
"SmMly" and "instability" were the two major themes of the Hong 
Kong press in reporting the situation in China. Chinese soldiers were described 
as barbarians who killed with no regrets. At the same time, any signs that 
indicated the instability of the Chinese leadership were given prominent coverage。 
^ Sing Pao, June 4，1989. 
^ Hong Kong Times, June 4，1989. 
^ U e People's Daily’ June 5, 1989. 
;86 
Again，it is found that this approach was adopted by all the five sampled 
newspapers regardless of their different interests. 
All five sampled newspapers carried detail descriptions of the 
'•barbaric act" of the Chinese soldiers. The following are the most outstanding 
examples from each of the five newspapers: 
Ta Kung …From the morning to the afternoon, every half an hour, every 
hour，shots of machine guns can be heard. We can see from a 
highnse post that more people were hit and carried away after each 
round of bullets... 
.•…Soldiers fired at civilians casually when they passed by the 
flyover at Fuxinmen. An old lady tried to cover herself up behind 
the columns under the flyover. The inhuman soldiers did not let her 
live. After a few shots, the old lady died. Her body was badly 
mined by bullets. 
"••The students that stayed in the Square were the poorest. A girl 
was shot over thirty times. Another girl challenged the army by 
vowmg to stay. The soldiers shot at her feet. She fell down and 
stood up again. This time she had seven bullets in her chest Other 
students wanted to drag her body back. They were also shot dead 
by the army. 
胸 胸 ...those who gathered as a crowd or walked near the army will be 
killed without being warned. The soldiers were killing ^^ if th^y 
were mad. “ 
….An old man was shot at the temple when he tried to approach 
the troops. 
•••• People noticed that some soldiers looked strange m their faces 
They sang when thev were, ^hnnting Some snldiers laughed whe.n 
someone was shot and fell Hnwn ^ ~ ~ 
施 g P如 ... According to some witnesses, some soldiers acted like th^y hnH 
taken dru^s. They smiled satisfactorily after shooting the people. 
.•…Somebody witnessed a three-year old boy being killed by a 
Ta Kung, June 5，1989. 
^ Wen Wei Pao, June 5，1989. 
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s f dier with bayonet. He was believed to be the youngest victim of 
me massacre. 
聊 inteJJ^ctual in Beijing told us that the soldier, wpt. jnct i.'v. 
mad dogs. Thev fired nt anyone they gpw “ 
According to the witness, a girl was killed when she stopped her 
bicycle m order to let the army trucks drive by. 
—e-产ar old boy was shot nine times. His mother showed his 
body to the troops, 
二 fJoChe s^dj^rs were obsessed with killing. They beat up everyone they 
saw. They killed every one they saw. ^ ^ 
二.Doct^ and nurses tried to save the lives of those who were 
S ^ d t ^ S T t f 广 d shouted.顶e soldiers replied not with words 
The politics in China was reported by the Hong Kong press 
within a framework of instability during this period. Stories which implied 
unsteadiness were given special weight. One illustrating example was the report 
on June 6 that different camps of troops were reported to have clashed in 
Beijing. All the sampled newspapers interpreted the clash as indications of 
serious instability in the army and in the leadership of China, as shown clearly 
in the following headlines: 
Ta The armv splits over the suppression. Troops exchanged fire at the 
southern suburb of Beijing. ^ 
胸 臉 广 truthof blood .wakened part of the troops Troops exchanged 
， a t the suburb of Beijing. Sounds of Caimom and gSns 
I m ^ Soldiers rather die than obey. Serious divergency in the 
•径 P w ；Mutiny in Reijing. Firinp At each other. The 27th Corps besieged 
by four other corps. Vowing for a bloody revenge. 
^ Sing Pao, June 5，1989. 
^ Hong Kong Times, June 5, 1989. 
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SzVzg Pao: Two groups of troops fought fiercely at the suburb of Beijing. China 
edging towards civil wnr. 
Times: Serious struggle in the army and the government of the CCP The 
Mainland on the brink of civil war. 
There were other reports that reflected the "instability frame" 
during the period. Ming Pao, for example, reported as the lead story on June 6 
that Li Peng was shot. On the same day, it also reported "unconfirmed 
information" that Deng Xiaoping had died. Wen Wei quoted some provincial 
authorities in China as saying that they “ do not know who is in charge."逝 The 
T i鹏 reported that the commanders of the garrisons in Shenyang and Nanjing 
tried to persuade troops in Chengdu to rebel. Other newspapers also did the 
same. The Oriental Daily News and the Express reported on June 6 that Deng 
Xiaoping had died. The Express, on the following day, reported that Li Peng had 
fled to Mongolia. All these reports were dismissed later. 
"^Wen Wei Pao, June 6. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
RETURN TO NORMALCY: THE FOURTH STAGE 
The public appearance of Deng Xiaoping on June gradually cleared 
up the political uncertainty in China. Step by step, the Chinese government 
restored the social and political of the country. Since then, the Hong Kong press 
gradually reverted to the routine mode of news framing. Organizational interests 
once again became the major factor. As a result, the five sampled newspapers 
went on separate ways again in reporting the student movement and the 
massacre. 
9.1 The Leftist press 
Ta Kung Pan 
Ta Kung Pao was the first among the five newspapers in reverting 
to its routine stand. Hie first hint could be found as early as June 10，the day just 
after Deng appeared on TV. Reporting Deng's public appearance, Ta Kung Pao 
simply printed the Xinhua dispatch without offering its own interpretation. Hie 
headline of the story was rather neutral comparing to other newspapers: 
" Deng Xiaoping appeared in Beijing yesterday. He urged to ca lmlv thinV 
about the past and the future ” ^  
No reference to the June 4 massacre can be found in Ta Rung's 
headline. Compare it to the headline of Wen Wei, another leftist paper: 
1 Ta Kung Pao，June 10，1989. 
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^Not mentioning the killing of civilians but praised the heros in the army 
Deng appeared yesterday claiming ‘revolt，suppressed. Open door policy 
and reform said ‘to be unchanged."‘ 
In fact, Ta Kung Pao was the only newspaper in Hong Kong which 
based its report of Deng's appearance solely on the official account of Xinhua. 
Most other newspapers offered their own interpretations of the story, which were 
primarily of two themes. Some viewed it as a symbol that Deng was in tight 
control and did not oppose to the massacre. ^ Others paid attention to the 
absence of Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili.' 
On the next day ( June 11 ), Ta Kung, like other newspapers, 
published the transcript of a taped speech of Cai Lin, a prominent student leader. 
Miss Cai accused the soldiers as "fascist" and "inhuman". Ta Kung reported these 
remarks but omitted the following: 
；^  The puppet central government led by Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Wang 
Zhen and Bo Yibo is counting its last days. Down with fascists. Down with 
military leadership. The people must win. Long live the republic." 
These radical remarks were fully reproduced in all other four 
sampled newspapers except Ta Kung. 
The televised speech of Wu'er Kaixi, another student leader was 
edited in a similar way by Ta Kung, The speech was the first concrete evidence 
that Wu'er, a popular figure in Hong Kong, escaped from China. It was a major 
story in all the sampled newspapers except Ta Kung Pao. Ta Kung put the news 
2 Wen Wei Pao, June 10，1989. 
3 E.g. Sing Pao, Ming Pao, South China Morning Post, the Hong Kong Standard. 
4 The Hong Kong Times，Wen Wei, Ming Pao. 
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only ill the lower part of the first page. The transcript was printed in page foun 
omitting these sensitive remarks: 
”…The counter-revolutionary warlords, the counter-revolutionary 
government and the fascist army led and directed bv T.i Pe.na 卯H Y . ^ 
bhangkun and orchestrnted bv Deng Xiaoping... 
..counter-r^olutionary warlords like Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and Yang 
histoty" ' are f站 cists. They are animals... They will face the trial of 
It should be pointed out that, however, the return of Ta Kung Pao 
to the Party line was not sudden. For a period of time, Ta Kung Pao did not 
completely give up its framing of the incident, as righteous movement brutally 
suppressed by the government. This attitude was still reflected in the treatment 
of news for some time. One of the examples was the government's announcement 
on June 13 of a wanted list of 21 students. Clearly indicating its protest, Ta Kung 
i^ao contradicted the announcement with the government's previous promise of 
not arresting students: 
“T^e promise of not arrestiV students Tint yPt fnrantf.n Beijing issued 
a nationwide warrant to arrest 21 students." 
Instead of reporting the wanted list in the lead of the story, the Ta 
Kung report started: 
… People in Hong Kong were surprised when they heard the news that 
Beijing wanted to arrest 21 student leaders. They pointed out that the 
government had promised not to arrest the students not long ago. They were 
puzzled by the new announcement. ‘ ^ ^ 
The remark of Mr. Yuan Mu，the spokesman of the State Council, 
5 Ta Kung, June 14，1989. 
;92 
on June 17 was treated in a similar way by Ta Kung Pao. Yuan said that no one 
was killed in Tiananmen Square and that the "counter-revolutionary revolt" was 
supported by someone in the top leadership. In the headline of the story, Ta 
脑g P叨 called these remarks “ amazing" and "astonishing".‘ 
However, Ta Kung did not stood by this line for very long before 
it completely shifted its frame and follow the official line again • On July 6， 
Xinhua News Agency carried a full report of Chen Xitung, the mayor of Beijing, 
on the suppression of the student. The report was the official account on the 
what had happened in China since April 1989. It continued to label the 
movement as a conspiracy to overthrow the communist regime and accused that 
Zhao Ziyang was behind it. It was obvious that these allegations went strongly 
against Ta Kung’s own interpretation. Hiis time, however, Ta Kung did nothing 
about it. It printed the Xinhua dispatch in full as the lead stoiy of "the day 
without trying to balance or contradict it with other reports. Tlie official 
accusations like "counter-revolutionaiy revolts" were no longer put in quotation 
marks. Tlie government accusations was legitimized by the way it was reported 
in Ta Kung Pao . ^ 
Wen Wei Pan 
PFe/z Wei Pao showed no sign of turning around in June and early 
July. One illustrating example was its report on the march in Hong Kong on July 
4，one month after the massacre in Beijing. Hie march was covered in detail as 
the lead local story of the day. Sensitive criticisms against Chinese leaders were 
6 Ta Kung Pao, June 17，1989. 
7 Ta Kung Pao, July 7，1989. 
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still reported in detail in Wen Wei: 
1 Mr. Lee Wing Tat (member of the group organizing the march) urged 
Ju^ese people all over the world not to forget the June 4 massacre. He 
condemned the Chinese government for killing and arresting people who 
took part m the pro-democracy movement. He said that rbinese nennl^ 
are at the peaK of their anf^ er. One dnv thP. whole popii1;^ tmn will tnkp to 
street to fi^ht ？ipm.nst the hnitnl re.^ im^ “» 
These remarks were not found in Ta Kung Pao. Instead they were 
summed up by Ta Kung Pao like this: 
k a 义 rs ofthe Alliance ( the organizer of the march ) like Szeto Wah 
Lau Chin Shek and Cheung Man Kwong spoke one after another. They 
i S S r o people to chase after the prime culprit of the Beijing 
However, following the dismissal of publisher Li Zisong on July 14 
9，Wen Wei also began to shift its stand. On July 15，Wen Wei, for the first time 
since June 4，used the term “ the June 4 incident" instead of "massacre" or 
"bloody suppression". From then on, news that were unfavourable to the 
Chinese government were relatively played down.( e . g . the formation the 
Alignment of All Hong Kong People in Support of a Democratic China on July 
17; the call to boycott the Asian Games on July 23 )• Like Ta Kung, the return 
of Wen Wei to the Party line was gradual but steady. Yet, it became all clear on 
October 2 when it reported the anti-Beijing demonstrations in Hong Kong on the 
anniversary day of the PRC. The story was only placed in page 11 ( all other 
sampled newspapers except Ta Kung and Wen Wei put the story in page 1). Hie 
8 Wen Wei Pao, July 5, 1989. 
in d I S r L ' t T S ? by 腳 A for not willing to M o w the Party line. The incident will be discussed 
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story not only avoided labelling the Chinese leaders such as "old monsters" it 
also tried to trivialize the rally with the following ‘facts，： 
：…TJe rally was due to commence on 3 pm and went on until 6 30 pm 
f ut because of the poor turnout, the organizers had to wait half an hour 
before the rally can start.. 
the rally, the reporter had asked some citizens in the Victoria 
Park if they would attend the demonstration. All oftheTns^ f^H nn Among 
those who were willing to elaborate, most people thought that the 
aimversary day was a dav to celehr^ t^e the birth of the country, fh； 
她 严 e ( the organizer of the rally) was wronp to organize surh ^ rnlly 
on that day… 工 
The Commercial Press 
For a period of time after the June 4 massacre, the Chinese leaders 
were de-legitimized by both Ming Pao and Sing Pao. The official capacity of 
senior leaders, especially Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, was ignored. Hiey were 
referred to as the "massacre clique" the "Li-Yang clique" or "those in power" • 
The anti-Chinese government sentiment was also clearly indicated by the way 
they handled stories related to the suppression of the pro-democracy movement. 
On the day the Chinese authorities released a wanted list of 21 student leaders 
(June 14)，for example, Sing Pao，s lead story was Japan's condemnation of the 
massacre. By such treatment, the importance and legitimacy of the wanted list 
was played down. In fact, most of the international protests over the massacre 
were reported prominently on Sing Pao in June. 
Ming Pao, on the other hand, indicated its stand clearly when it 
reported the report of Beijing Mayor Chen Xitung. The Ming Pao story about the 
report was supplemented by the reporter's interpretation: 
“Chen Xitmig，s report concentrated at attacking those who supported the 
10 Ming Pao, October 2, 1989. 
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student movement. He is especially interested in describing how ^counter-
revolutionary rebels cruelly killed the soldiers，. However, he did not say 
a word about the massacre by the army."" 
However, such explicit stand against the Chinese government 
gradually vanished in the two commercial papers. Two months later, when the 
Chinese government celebrated the 40th anniversary of the PRC, both Ming Pao 
and Sing Pao reported the ceremony in a "neutral" way without indicating their 
own stand. Although both newspapers emphasised that the ceremony was held 
under martial law, none of them "de-legitimize" the Chinese leadership anymore. 
9.4 Reporting the Anniversaiy under the Routine Mode 
We have discussed the gradual frame shift of both the leftist and 
the commercial press above. The rightist press, on the other hand, showed no 
indication of modifying its hard-line attitude towards the communist regime. As 
a result, stories were 
again framed differently by different type of newspapers. One good example was 
the 40th anniversary of the People's Republic of China on October 1，1989. 
The leftist newspapers reported the festival in a positive way。 
"Joyfulness" was the theme of their reports. This theme was indicated clearly in 
the headline of both Ta Kung and Wen Wei: 
Ta Kung:丨 :Big celebrations in Beijing last night. Millions of people celebrated 
joyfully." ^ 
u Ming Pao, July 7, 1987. 
Ta Kung, October 2, 1989. 
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� � : “Millions of people celebrated the anniversary of the PRC last 
night." 13 
Detail descriptions of firework and performance filled the whole 
report of the leftist papers. The people were reported to have "cheered with joy" 
during the fire work performance. 
The atmosphere described by the commercial papers, however, was 
quite different. Both Ming Pao and Sing Pao stressed that it was the first time the 
PRC celebrated its anniversaiy under martial law. Both papers paid special 
attention to the tense atmosphere in Beijing. Ming Pao, for example, reported 
that extra safety measures were introduced during the performance: 
”Because of the June 4 incident, the organizers worried about the safety 
geasure，very much. All performers had to abide by three regulations 
hrst，only transparent plastic bags can be used. Second, cans and bottles 
are not allowed. Third, in case of unexpected events, all performers had 
to lie down immediately.." 
Sing P叨 also reported that “ some policemen were equipped with 
anti-riot gears" and that ” some policemen carried machine guns". Hiese ‘facts， 
were not found in the leftist papers. 
Yet，the anniversary portrayed by the commercial papers was not 
quite the same with the one in the Hong Kong Times, Unlike the commercial 
papers which focused only on tensions, the Times directly contrasted the 
celebrations with the massacre: 
”According to diplomats, the '40th anniversary of the communist regime 
celebrated m loneliness because of the June 4 massacre. In 
Tianaimen Square, the hot spot of the student movement a few months 
ago, PLA soldiers played the song "Praise Our Country". There was also 
a tirework performance. However, many of the friends of the CCP did not 
share this gionous moment. 
Wen Wei Pao, October 2, 1989. 
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A western diplomat said, ‘it is a bit awkward to sing and dance in this 
square.... 
….A Beijing citizen said that the shock of the June 4 massacre is not 
二er He said，‘if I ever come across U Peng, I will stab him into 
pieces.… 
The comparisons above revealed how different newspapers framed 
these kinds of events after the crisis period. The leftist papers had returned 
completely to the party line. The commercial papers still offered their own 
interpretations, but refrained themselves from going too far. The authority of the 
present leadership of the Chinese government, although once called the "massacre 
clique'•，was fully recognized. Hie Times, standing firmly by its anti-Communist 
stance，still showed no hesitation in explicitly condemning the massacre. Hie 
consonance of the Hong Kong press during the crisis had come to an end. 
“Hong Kong Times, October 2, 1989. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE NEWSROOM IN CRISIS: PERSONAL JUDGEMENT UNSUPPRESSED 
Tlie content analysis reported in the last four chapters illustrated 
an interesting pattern of news framing of the Hong Kong press during the 1989 
pro-democracy movement in China. It is found that newspapers with different 
interests had approached the movement with different angles at the beginning. 
However，the differences vanished during the crisis stage but appeared again after 
the crisis was over. 
It is hypothesized in this thesis that during the crisis, the journalists' 
personal attitude and judgement will become more important in news framing。 
Interviews of reporters and editors supported the hypothesis in the case of the 
leftist press and the commercial press. The case in the Hong Kong Times was 
however quite different. 
10.1 The Leftist press 
Tight Control in Rontine Times 
In normal times, both Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao are tightly 
controlled by Beijing to ensure what they publish are in line with the interest of 
the Chinese government. Tlie control is exercised by the local branch of the New 
China News Agency by various means. 
According to Tsang Tak Shing, the chief editor of Ta Kung Pao, 
NCNA seldom interferes with the daily operations of Ta Kung and Wen Wei, 
However, NCNA holds the decisive power of appointing the publisher and senior 
editing staff of the two ultra-leftist newspapers. These people are carefully 
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selected among those who are able to “ toe the Party line’？ 
There is also always a "representative" of NCNA who holds a key 
editorial post (such as Deputy chief editor or Chief editor) in both papers. ^ 
Although their "official capacity" is never formally announced, nobody in the two 
newspapers doubt their authorities. ^ According to Li Zisong, the former 
publisher of Wen Wei Pao，these representatives frequently interfere with the 
editorial policy of the newspapers.‘ 
Furthermore, a number of senior editorial staff in the editorial 
committee of both Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao are members of the 
Communist Party. In terms of Party discipline, they have to obey the leadership 
of NCNA. 5 In Wen Wei Pao, for example, during the student movement last 
year，four out of the five members of the standing committee of the editorial 
committee were Communist Party members.‘ 
Apart from these kinds of invisible control, it is known that there 
are regular briefings in the NCNA for the publishers and chief editors of both 
leftist papers to inform them of the Party line on specific issues. Information as 
sucli becomes a major factor of the chief editor's judgement. Sometimes, it is 
incorporated into the editorial policy which is made known to all reporters and 
1 Interview with Tsang Tak Shing, the chief editor of Ta Kung Pao, May 30, 1989. 
2 See Li Zisong, ” Wind and Rain Started by Bureaucrats； The C o n 一 一 一 Dec. 16，1989. 
3 Interview with a former senior reporter of Wen Wei Pao. 
4 Same as footnote 2. 
W o l ^ t c ^ ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ S 二 • of NCNA is the "Hong and Macau 
CM^g Sze^ei, “ How tHe 匚 卩 匚 ？ ’ ^ ‘ ^ ; ! 。 : ^ ! ^ ^ ^ ^ 二 ; S f 。 ^ . ($。。 
6 Interview with a former editor of Wen Wei Fao. 
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editors. A recent example was the treatment of news relating to the situation in 
Eastern Europe. Hie instruction was to "piay it down".， 
For the low ranking reporters and editors of the leftist papers, the 
organizational control is always more indirect. According to reporters in both Ta . 
迎d 胸 pre/1 intendewed, there is no explicit instruction that they must , 
follow the party line when writing their stories. However, there is seldom any 
doubt. ” You know what kind of newspapers they are before you join," remarks 
one Ta Kung Pao reponer. “ After some time, you know what can be published 
and what cannot. You leam through daily work," he added. And the NCNA is 
never subtle i . indicating its preference. It selects stories in different newspapers 
everyday and edits it into a pamphlet and sends it to all the leftist newspapers. 
“This is the billboard chart for us”，said a fonner Ta Kun, Pao reporter’ "from 
the order of the stories we know what the NCNA prefers". 
Both consciously and unconsciously, the reporters have followed the 
rule of the game. H^ey gradually leam to avoid writing something which they 
thinlc may be too sensitive. A Ta Kun, Pao reporter cited the example of the 
reporting of the so-called "democrats" in Hong Kong. She said that most of the 
stories about them were edited into a short piece. Now, she Just does not bother 
to write long stories about them.' 
Tsang tak-shing, the chief editor of Ta Kun^Pao stressed that there 
is no prior censorship in the leftist papers by NCNA. ^ TOs may be true. But with 
such a tight ⑶咖I，both visible and invisible, both direct and indirect, censorship 
\ - 碰 咖 碰 reporters and editors both in 丁a Kun, and P T e . 账 
Personal interview. 、 
9 Personal interview. 
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is almost unnecessary. 
Loosening of Control in rWcic 
However, the tight control of NCNA over the content of the leftist 
papers was found to be paralysed during the student movement last year. Hie 
uncertainties of the situation made it difficult even for NCNA to fully grasp the 
development of the situation. According to He Mingsze，the former deputy 
general secretary of the NCNA, even Xu Jiatun, the NCNA director at that time, 
was not sure about what was really going on?。 
As a result, NCNA was unable to give clear instructions. It is 
known that, shortly after the death of Hu Yaobang, NCNA had advised both 
leftist papers to "play down" the student movement.u However, as the situation 
became more tense and uncertain, NCNA gave no further advice.】： Hie leftist 
papers were left on their own to interpret the situation. 
"At that time, even NCNA did not know who was in power and 
what would happen next, “ said a former deputy chief editor of Wen Wei Pao， 
"how were they able to give us instructions ？“ Another Wen Wei Pao reporter 
said, "I believed that the regular links between the leftist press and NCNA was 
temporarily disconnected for a period of time." 
As a result, the responsiMity of "toeing the Party line" was left to 
the hands of the senior editorial staff of the leftist newspapers. However, they 
also lack the information to make their judgement. Hie chief editor of Ta Kung 
P叨 admitted that "things looked strange since the People's Daily editorial on 
“ 还 热 — 請 Official Commenting on Xu Jiatun/ The C o n — r y 
”Interview with a former deputy chief editor of Wen Wei Pao. 
Ibid. 
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April 26" but he "did not quite understand what was going on". Consequently, he 
did not give any specific instructions to his staff and even "depended on the 
information sent back by the reporters in Beijing to judge the situation". In Wen 
• ~ ， 出 e deputy publisher Chen Baojien, widely conceived as the 
representative of NCNA 〖^，was absent in a number of editorial meetings during 
the period? Publisher Li Zisong told his staff to "report it as what it is". Tlie 
burden of defining the situation, then, was placed upon the journalists, both 
reporters and editors, who actually handled the story. 
The Personal Involvement of Jourrmlkts durinf? the, rvkk 
In the beginning stage of the student movement, reporters of the 
leftist press had also refrained from pushing their personal views too hard. One 
of the examples was Liu Ruishao, the then Beijing correspondent of Wen Wei 
肌 According to Uu, he sympathised with the students ever since the movement 
unfolded and totally disagreed to the People's Daily editorial that labelled the 
movement as "riots,’. However, he could only criticize the editorial subtly in his 
story. The editorial was not even directly mentioned尸 
“始e r all these years in Beijing I know the rule of the game very 
well，" Liu said, “ I know what can be accepted by the authorities."'' 
However，following the development of the movement, Liu could 
not help but be deeply involved. “ Hie turing point was certainly the imposition 
of martial law on May 20，" Liu said, "it reached a critical stage. You had to 
u Chen was a former vice-director of the NCNA. 
“Interview with a former deputy chief editor of Wen Wei Pao. 
^ Liu，s article was quoted in page 64 of this thesis. 
16 Personal interview. 
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choose between what is absolutely right and what is absolutely wrong." 
Yung Wei Ling, the Ta Kung Pao reporter covering the movement, 
shared this view. “ The students were staging a hunger strike. Many were sent to 
the hospital. Yet the government still refused to talk to them. Seeing this, you 
couldn't help taking a stand." Yung said. Hie stand, of course, was to support 
the students. 
Both Liu Ruishao and Yung Wei Ling admitted that, although 
unconsciously, their strong personal feelings had "inevitably" affected the way they 
reported the news. Hieir explicit stance in the stories favourable to the students 
during the period was reinforced because it was not challenged by their editors 
in Hong Kong. Yung said that she was more confident when she saw that almost 
everything she wrote was printed, including sensitive criticisms against the 
Chinese leaders. In normal times, these criticisms stands "no chance at all" to be 
found in her newspapers. ’TTiat was the period I enjoy most freedom since I 
joined Ta Kung Pao in 1982，" she said. 
In fact, in the newsrooms of both Wen Wei Pao and Ta Kung Pao 
in Hong Kong, the emotion was also very high. Both newspapers sent telexes to 
Zhao Ziyang on May 18 and urged him to open dialogues with the students who 
had been hunger-striking for three days. On May 22, the staff of Ta Kung Pao 
joined the big rally in Hong Kong to support the students. Some of the Wen Wei 
P如 staff also joined the march in their personal capacity. 
Even the major gatekeepers in the newsrooms were highly involved 
in the crisis. In Wen Wei Pao, publisher Li Zisong showed his stand dearly after 
the Chinese government imposed martial law in Beijing on May 20. He personally 
decided to pubHsh the famous editorial on May 21. The editorial carried only 
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four characters: Tonxin Jishoii ("heart-stricken") in a sea of white space. Tlie 
editorial acted as a strong protest to the Beijing authorities. Mr. Chen Baojien, 
the deputy publisher who represents the interest of NCNA, agreed to this 
editorial and said that he was prepared to end up in jail in Beijing.口 
In Ta Kung Pao, Mr. Tsang Tak Shing, the chief editor, admitted 
that even he himself was too involved to carry out the duty of gatekeeping. "In 
that atmosphere I cannot help but be affected by my emotion. My work 
discipline was loosened." He said. 
He cited two examples. The first was the story about clashes 
between rival camps of troops after June 4. He said that the whole story was 
based on a telephone interview with a man in the Beijing University. Nobody 
knew who that man was. 
The second example was a story sent by a reporter in Beijing after 
the massacre. Tlie story described how a girl was shot thirty times before she 
died.i9 Tlie reporter later confessed that the story was based on the descriptions 
of a waiter in the hotel. 
Mr. Tsang said that if he had thought about it calmly, he would not 
have agreed to publishing these stories. ’There was no way you can confirm these 
reports during that time. You had to rely on you own judgement," Mr. Tsang said, 
"my judgement at that moment was that these things were possible and 
reasonable. You could not help but be affected by your personal feeling under 
that kind of atmosphere." 
17 Li Zisong, “ Wind and Rain Started by Bureaucrats； The Contemporary M^^.zi'ne. Dec.l6，1989, 
18 Personal, interview, 
扮 Tlie story was quoted in page 97 in tliis thesis. 
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As a result of the loosening of control from NCNA and the strong 
personal involvement in the crisis, both Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Fao took an 
unusual move to deviate from their pro-Chinese government stand for the first 
time in forty years. 
Control Resumed Aftp.r rWcic 
Deng Xiaoping's public appearance on June 9 was the turning point 
which marked the end of the uncertainties in Beijing. It was also after Deng's 
appearance that NCNA gradually resumed the control over Ta Kung Pao and 
Wen Wei Pao. 
It was known that Mr. Xu Jiatun, director of NCNA at that time, 
had talked to the publishers and chief editors of both Ta Kung Pao and Wen 
购/ Pao shortly after June 9 and asked them to "slowly turned around". ^ It was 
also reported that senior Chinese leaders had instructed NCNA to "recapture the 
leftist papers just like recapturing the Tiananmen Square", 
As a result, both Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Pao re-adopted their 
pro-Beijing line in less than two months after the June 4 massacre. However, 
there was a different process of "normalization" in the two leftist newspapers. 
In Ta Kung Pao，chief editor Tsang Tak Shing told his staff shortly 
after June 9 that Ta Kung Pao had to ”tiy to preserve its unique position to be 
able to publish in the Mainland" and "that this is the only way Ta Kung Pao can 
continue its contribution to improve the situation in China." ^ His words were 
widely seen by the Ta Kung staff as a clear message that Ta Kung had to revert 
nlcn龙 S e � L i ^ o n g , “ If I A^eed to Turn Around, “ The Contemporary Map.zin^. March 24 1990 It k 
also confirmed by senior ranking editors in both Ta Kung Pao Bud Wen Wei Pao. 
21 The Hong Kong Economic Timpc JUne 22, 1989. 
^ Interview with a Ta Kung reporter. 
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to its pro-Beijing stand. 
Later，Mr. Tsang made it clear to his staff that "as a discipline, Ta 
如 had to "stand by its own line". Sensitive criticisms, "such as those by the 
Hong Koti^ AlHanre in Support of the ChinP.P Patriotic Pm-H^n^n广ro了 
Movement cannot be published." 
Defending himself against criticisms of swaying, Tsang Tak Shing 
interpreted the situation this way, ”Ta Kung Pao had never taken a stand to 
overturn the Communist leadership，" he stressed, “ we usually considered the 
views of the Chinese government as very important. It was just that during the 
crisis, the uncertainties lowered the authority of the government or certain 
leaders of the government. After the crisis, the views of the Chinese government, 
now stable, has again become an important factor in our considerations." 
The Ta Kung Pao staff, on the other hand, took the change as 
"inevitable". ^ Two reporters left. Those who stay have to suppress their personal 
feelings. "We cannot change the stand of the newspaper on our own," said a Ta 
彻打g 尸卯 reporter，“ as long as I am not forced to write something to support 
their massacre, I will stay." 
Such was the process of how Ta Kung Pao reverted to its 
traditional stand. The process of Wen Wei Pao, however, was not that smooth, 
Mr. U Zisong, the publisher of Wen Wei Pao, had refused to respond to the 
advice of NCNA. There was sharp confrontation between him and Mr. Chen 
Baojien^ the deputy publisher, over the editorial line of the newspaper since the 
忽 Personal interview with Mr. Tsang Tak Shing. 
以 Personal interview with a Ta Kung Pao reporter. 
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public appearance of Deng Xiaoping on June 9.^ On July 14，1989，NCNA 
"terminated the service" of Mr. Li. Hiirty reporters and editors resigned in 
support of their former publisher. Since then, Wen Wei Pao joined Ta Kung Pao 
again in the camp of "patriotic newspapers under the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist party". 
10*2 The Commercial Press 
Self-control in Normal Time^ 
Interviewees from both Ming Pao and Sing Pao reported that they 
enjoy relatively high autonomy in their work. - A Sing Pao reporter even 
complained of the lack of guidelines from the editorial staff. ^ 
Even so, it would be wrong to assume that there is no 
organizational control in the commercial newspapers. Unlike the leftist press, the 
commercial newspapers do not usually tell their reporters how certain stories 
should be written. However, the editors know how stories "should not be written". 
In Sing Pao，for example, things that are "too radical" are usually 
avoided. These include "sensitive criticisms with an explicit stand against Hong 
Kong or Chinese government."雄 These are not written rules. Nor has anyone 
been formally briefed on this. However, they are accepted " naturally by almost 
7 � � r a de t- description of what happened in Wen Wei Pao after June 9，see ” The Memoirs of Li 
aong^ in the Contemporary Mafwin尸 from November 1989 to April 1990. 。 
„ t � ? chjef editor of Ming Pao recalled only one time in recent years that Mr Louis Cha, the 
Personal interview. 
雄 Personal interview with a high ranking editor of Sing Pao. 
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all Sing Pao reporters and editors as an important part of their news judgement. ^ 
hMing Pao, the unwritten rules was that "it should avoid elements 
that would de-stabilize the society of Hong Kong". " Ming Pao is a well 
established newspaper," remarks a deputy chief editor of the newspaper, "like all 
established newspapers we are for a stable environment". ^ Like Sing Pao, these 
unwritten rules are widely accepted by its staff. 
It should be noted, however, that these unwritten rules are accepted 
by most reporters and editors voluntanlv 抓d sometime. As one 
彻容 Pao reporter pointed out, “ I don't usually think of the interest of the 
newspaper when I write stories. However, I know what I write can be 
published…••It's just part of my own news judgement.'"' 
During The Crkk 
It is found that, however, these unwritten rules were not observed 
during the crisis period in the student movement last year. Contrary to their 
traditional "neutrality", both newspapers had taken a clear stand against the 
Chinese government 
in their reports after the imposition of martial law. After the massacre, they were 
even as radical as the rightist Hong Kong Times. ^ Interviewees in both Ming Pao 
and Sing Pao attributed this to their strong personal feelings in support of the 
students that time. 
^ Personal interview with a Sing Pao reporter. 
^ Personal interview. 
31 Personal interview. 
See chapter eight of this thesis. 
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“A reporter is just a man," said a deputy chief editor of Ming Pao, 
“it was impossible for him to keep calm in such a crisis." 
“You know you should be objective, but you just can't," echoed a 
Sing Pao reporter. 
The involvement of the journalists was so high that even the 
publisher could do nothing. “ We have always stressed neutrality and objectivity," 
recalled Mr. Louis Cha, the publisher oi Ming Pao, in an editorial, “ during the 
critical period (of the student movement), I reminded them of this several times 
a day. However...how could one still be completely calm and objective in that 
critical moment?'"^ 
On the other hand, the uncertainties during the crisis left the 
journalists with no other means but relying on their own judgement to interpret 
the situation. And their judgements were seriously affected by their personal 
feelings. Two days after the massacre, for example, Ming Pao inaccurately 
reported that Premier Li Peng was shot by a body guard. A deputy chief editor 
of the newspaper explained that they got the story from a usually reliable source 
but had no way to confirm it. "But under that circumstances we decided that it 
was totally possible that someone would have tried to kill Li Peng for what he 
had done，" he said, "therefore we decided to run the story." 
A Sing Pao editor also recalled how he decided to publish the story 
that China was in the "crisis of civil war". ^ "It was already two o'clock in the 
morning when I saw on CNN that rival troops in China were fighting fiercely," 
^ Editorial of Ming Pao, May 20, 1990. 
^ Sing Fao 6，1989。 
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he said, "I was expecting this to happen. I did not hesitate to believe it and asked 
to revise the layout of page one which had already been prepared." 
After The fVkk 
Like the leftist press, the commercial newspapers gradually revert 
to its "neutral" stand after the public appearance of Deng Xiaoping on June 9. 
Reporters and editors of Ming Pao and Sing Pao attribute the change to two 
reasons. 
Firsts the appearance of Deng Xiaoping and the following Central 
Committee meeting marked an end to the uncertainties in the Chinese 
leadership. The journalists had to re-adjust their evaluation of the situation. "We 
have to admit that the present leadership is the legitimate Chinese government；' 
said a Sing Pao editor, "we cannot be too radical against them. We are not the 
Hong Kong Times" 
The second reason was that the strong personal feelings of the 
journalists gradually died down after a period of lapse. Their commitment to 
objectivity and balance reporting, once disappeared during the crisis, again 
became a major factor in their news judgement. As a Ming Pao reporter pointed 
out, ” When you calmed yourself down you began to feel that you may have been 
going too far during the crisis." As a result, the journalists took pains too avoid 
being affected by their personal feeling in their reports. 
The process of the revert of the commercial press may be best 
Slimmed up by a Sing Pao reporter as follows，"During that period your personal 
involvement was so strong..., you allowed yourself to do things that you don't 
usually do.…and there was no one to control you. When the situation returns to 
normal, you just can't do that anymore." 
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10.3 The Rightist press 
Our interviews revealed that the routine way of news framing in 
the Hong Kong Times had not quite been challenged during the crisis last year. 
Unlike the leftist press and the commercial press, the organizational 
interest of the Times was clear and strong throughout the whole incident last 
year. A deputy chief editor of the Times said that they did "what they have been 
doing for forty years" in reporting the student movement and the massacre in 
Beijing last year. "Our line was clear," he said, "the Beijing students were 
righteous in resisting the dictatorship. We have to point this out to our readers. 
We have been standing firmly by this line.'’於 
The uncertainties in the Chinese leadership did not constitute any 
difficulties for the Times. According to the deputy chief editor, "it didn't make 
any difference to us. They were still Communists after all." 
The journalists of the Times, most of them Hong Kong citizens, 
were also strongly involved. But since their stand coincided with the interests of 
the newspapers, it is difficult to tell whether the personal interests of the 
journalists were less suppressed during the crisis. 
A Times reporter who was sent to Beijing to cover the student 
movement said that； we did not have to play up or play down anything. We just 
reported the facts in the wav T s^w th^m Everything was just as usual." 
^ Personal interview. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
11.1 The Existence of the Crisis Mode in News Framing 
Tliis study found an interesting pattern in the framing of the 
Tiananmen Square Incident by the Hong Kong Press. At first, newspapers with 
different organizational interests (leftist, rightist and commercial) framed the 
movement in completely different ways. However, they converged with each other 
as the situation gradually turned into a crisis. The convergence lasted for less 
than two months. When the situation was stabilized, different types of newspapers 
again provided different frames, each according to their own organizational 
interest. The following table summarizes the patterns of the news frames 
observed in different stages of the movement: 
〒 ， l stage 2 Stage 3 stage d 
(Routine) (Transition；.!) (crisis� (Roi^ine� 
Left土St Mourning Problem- Pro-democ. Pro-govt. 
solving Anti-govt, 
C�舰 r c i a l Tension Pro-deiaoc• Prcdemoc• neutral 
Conflict Anti-govt• moderate 
Rightist Pro-democ. Pro-democ. Pro-democ. Anti_ 
Anti-govt• Anti-govt• Anti-govt• govt• 
During the first stage of the movement, the leftist TaKung Pao and 
W 饥 胸 P如 reported the marches and demonstrations during this period as part 
of the activities to moum the death of the former General Party Secretary Hu 
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Yaobang. The political demands of the students were played down. The 
"mourning frame" served to de-politicize the whole student movement. By so 
framing the student movement, the authority of the Chinese Communist Party 
would not be seriously challenged. 
Meanwhile, the rightist Hong Kong Times framed the movement 
with totally different emphases. According to the description of the Times, the 
movement was a massive resistance against the Communist regime. It was 
obvious that the "anti-government" frame, served the interest of the Taiwanese 
authorities. 
Tlie commercial newspapers, on the other hand, paid less attention 
than the partisan press to the political implications of the movement. Although 
they did not play down the pro-democracy nature of the movement as the leftist 
press did, they were not as keen as the Times to frame the movement within a 
anti-Communist context. Instead, the commercial papers were more interested in 
the tensions and the conflicts between demonstrators and the police. 
The "tension frame" of the commercial newspapers was also in line 
with their organizational interests. As we have pointed out in Chapter Four of 
this thesis, commercial newspapers are careful not to be involved too 腿ch in 
political affairs.. As a result, they were more interested in reporting what 
happened at the scene rather than the implications. In the case of demonstrations 
and riots, then, conflicts and tensions became a natural news angle. 
During the second stage, however, the situation gradually moved 
from a routine to a crisis. Hie news frames of the leftist press and the 
commercial press began to shift. 
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The leftist press started to deviate from the official line since the 
publication of the People's Daily editorial on April 26 which denounced the 
student movement as an anti-Communist conspiracy. However, the deviation was 
relatively subtle. Sensitive criticisms against the Government and the Party were 
carefully and tactfully avoided by both Ta Kung and Wen Wei. Instead, they tried 
to play up "sensible" moves by both the students and the government in order to 
endorse a peaceful resolution of the problem. 
The commercial newspapers, on the other hand, began to give up 
their neutral stand and took side with the students. At the beginning of the 
second stage of the movement, Sing Pao stuck to its "conflict" and "tension" 
frames. Ming Pao, on the other hand, shifted to a "problem-solving" approach 
which was similar to that of the leftist press. However, after the Chinese 
government refused to hold "open dialogues" with the students who were staging 
a hunger strike, both commercial papers no longer avoided being involved in 
politics. They began to express clearly their support for the demands of the 
students. Tliey also blamed the government for being stubborn and inhuman. 
The imposition of martial law on May 20 marked the beginning of 
the crisis stage. During this stage, the three types of newspapers (leftist, 
commercial and rightist) exhibited no difference at all in the framing of the 
situation. All of them firmly supported the people and condemned the 
government for enhancing the tension in the Chinese capital. The convergence 
intensified after the June 4 massacre. For a couple of days after that, it was 
almost impossible to tell whether a story was carried by leftist or rightist 
newspapers by just reading it. 
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Yet，the converged pattern totally changed after the public 
appearance of Deng Xiaoping on June 9. In less than four months, the leftist 
press and the commercial press gradually reverted to their routine stand. Hie 
leftist press again followed the Party line closely. Hie 40th anniversary of the 
Republic was reported by both Wen Wei and Ta Kung as a fabulous event without 
mentioning the bloodshed in the Tiananmen Square just 120 days ago. TOs is a 
clear indicator that the massacre no longer plays a part in the leftist press's 
journalistic paradigm on Chinese poHtical news. 
Hie commercial press, on the other hand, gradually took away 
phases and expressions that served to de-legitimize the Chinese government in 
their stories. Like the leftist press, the commercial newspapers reverted to their 
old stand and put themselves in a "neutral" position towards the Beijing regime 
again. 
This sums up the frame shift of the Hong Kong press on the whole 
Tiananmen Square Incident. The next question to ask, of course, is: Why did it 
happen this way? 
We have hypothesized that during a crisis, (1) the organizational 
control on journalists will be loosened because of the uncertainties of the 
situation; (2) the strong personal involvement of journalists will turn them into 
advocates rather than gatekeepers and (3) as a result, the personal interest of 
journalists will become more important in the framing of news in a crisis than in 
a routine situation. These suppositions seemed to fit veiy well in explaining the 
f^ rame shift of the Hong Kong press during the Tiananmen Square Incident. 
In half a year's time, the Hong Kong press have moved from the 
routine mode to the crisis mode and then back to the routine mode again. During 
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the first stage of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing in 1989，the situation 
still seemed to be under control. Although there were rallies and riots, the 
political structure of the Chinese government was relatively stable. The 
involvement of Hong Kong people, on the other hand, was still low. In other 
words, the Hong Kong press was then still operating in the routine mode. 
In the routine mode, as we have pointed out, the organizational 
control on the journalists is always effective. Personal feelings of the journalists 
are suppressed. As a result, news framing is usually dominated by organizational 
interests. It is no wonder, therefore, that three different types of newspapers 
framed the movement with completely different emphases, each according to 
their organizational interests. 
However，following the students，persistent hunger strike and the 
imposition of martial law in mid May, the crisis precipitated. As we have pointed 
out Chapter Three of this thesis, a crisis is usually featured with uncertainties and 
high involvement among members of the society. It is found that under such 
circumstances, organizational control in newspapers began to weaken. The 
journalists，personal inclinations became more important in news framing. 
The picture was particularly clear in the two leftist papers, TaKung 
尸卯 and Wen Wei Pao. Our findings indicated that both papers were tightly 
controlled in routine times by the Beijing authorities through the local branch of 
NCNA^ Yet, during the crisis, the situation was so uncertain that even NCNA 
were not able to give instructions. As a result, the reporting and editorial staff of 
the newspapers became the major definers of the situation. Hieir strong 
involvement pushed both Ta Kung Fao and Wen Wei Pao to a anti-governinem 
stand. 
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In the two commercial newspapers, the situation was a bit more 
complicated. Tlie publishers of both Ming Pao and Sing Pao seldom control the 
content of their newspapers directly. However, the organizational cannon of the 
newspaper, such as to be "neutral"，"responsible" and "not being radical", are 
usually internalized by the journalists uncoiLsdonslv as part of their profession^] 
md^ement. 
During the crisis, the strong involvement turned the reporters and 
editors of the commercial newspapers from gatekeepers into advocates. 
"Neutrality" and "moderation" could no longer suppress their personal interests. 
Because of the uncertainties of the situation, on the other hand, the journalists 
had to rely more on their personal judgement to define the situation. As s result, 
the framing of the crisis was also dominated by the journalists，personal interests 
in the commercial press. 
The ambiguities of the situation were gradually cleared when Deng 
Xiaoping was seen at the front stage again on June 9，1989. Since then, the Hong 
Kong press had slowly reverted to the routine mode. Organizational interests of 
newspapers again became the major factor of news framing. 
The process was again more obvious in the leftist press. After 
Deng，s re-appearance, NCNA regained control on both Wen Wei Pao and Ta 
�� step by step. It (NCNA) successfully did so in less than two months. 
The two leftist papers once again became "patriotic newspapers under the 
leadership of the Commimist Party". Although quite a number of journalists were 
not happy with this, they could do nothing other than quitting or remaining silent. 
In the commercial press, the process of reverting was more subtle。 
Unlike the leftist press, there was no pressure from "up above". It was just that 
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the journalists began to revert to their routine way of thinking when the situation 
gradually calmed down. Organizational and professional interest once again 
became major factors in their considerations. Hiey were again keen to avoid 
being seen as radical and biased. Voluntarily and unconsciously, they joined the 
leftist press in going back to the routine mode of news framing. 
A fair challenge to this conclusion can be pointed at the case of 
commercial newsp叩ers. It can be argued that both Ming Pao and Sing Pao took 
an anti-Beijing stand only because their publishers were also enraged by the high-
handed measures of the Chinese government. In other words, the shifts in news 
frames during the crisis in the two commercial papers were due to the shift in 
organizational interests rather than the loosening of organizational control. TTiis 
is a sensible argument except for one weakness: it fails to differentiate between 
the personal attitude of the newspapers，publisher and the interests oQh^ 
newspaper itself. In fact, the two are not always identical. It is true that the 
publisher's views do play a very important role in deciding the editorial policy of 
the newspaper. However, even the publisher himself/herself has to sometimes 
refrain from pushing his/her own view too far in order not to jeopardise the 
survival of the newspaper. Tlie fact that commercial newspapers always take a 
neutral and moderate stand does not necessarily mean that the publishers of 
these newspapers are also always neutral and moderate. It can be just that the 
publishers have hidden their personal views from time to time in order not to 
let their newspapers be criticized as "biased" and "radical". 
Now let us go back to the Tiananmen Square incident. It is sensible 
to believe that both the publishers oiMingPao and Sing Pao also shared the rage 
of their subordinates during the peak of the student movement. In fact，Mr. Louis 
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Cha^ the publisher of Ming Pao, was seen burst into tears in a television interview 
after the June 4 massacre. However, what they thought is not the main point in 
our discussion. It is because, as discussed above, the publishers can still refrain 
from pushing their own views if they are against the interest of the newspapers. 
The point is, therefore, why they did not stop their newspapers from taking an 
explicit anti-Beijing stand- something that might seriously jeopardize the survival 
of their newspapers. 
The answer, I think, still lies within our discussion of news framing 
in crisis. In the Tiananmen Square crisis, the situation was so uncertain that it 
became very difficult for the publishers to judge what the best interests for their 
newspapers were. It was not sure whether the "reformists", led by former Party 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang, or the "Li-Yang clique" would have survived the power 
struggle within the Chinese leadership. Hie political vacuum, therefor, provided 
a leeway for personal interpretations. 
It was against this background that the publishers of commercial 
newspapers allowed their editors and reporters to show an explicit stand during 
the crisis. The fact that the publishers probably shared the same view no doubt 
gave the journalists more room to express their own personal inclinations. We do 
not know what would have happened if the publishers stood by Li Peng while the 
journalists supported Zhao Ziyang. But if it had not been for the uncertainties 
during the crisis，such explicit anti-Beijing stand would not be found in 
commercial newspapers even if their publishers were strongly dissatisfied with 
Premier Li Peng or other senior leaders in the Communist regime. 
11»2 Crisis Mode of News Framing Reconsidered 
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This study reveals some of the differences between routine and 
crisis news framing. Like all case studies, this study cannot avoid being criticised 
as lacking generalizing power. Hie uniqueness of the Tiananmen Square tragedy 
makes this criticism even more valid. The incident is no doubt an extreme 
example of a crisis where both uncertainties and involvement are extraordinarily 
high. However, as a preliminary study, these extremities unveil more clearly how 
differently a news event can be framed in the routine mode and the crisis mode. 
Similar studies on other types and scales of crises are recommended to explore 
the features of news framing in a crisis situation. It is only through comparisons 
of different studies are we able to grasp the whole picture. 
I think it can fairly be argued that during all crises, news 
organizations will depend more on the journalists to define the situation than in 
normal times. One simple reason is that in a crisis, no matter it be a coup 
attempt or a natural disaster, there is usually not enough time and way to carry 
out the normal gatekeeping process. Furthermore, as pointed out before, 
journalists are less reserved to put forward their own interpretations in crises than 
in routine situation. 
However，it would be wrong to assume that personal inclinations 
of journalists will become the maj^ factor in the framing of any crises as they 
were in the framing of the Tiananmen Square Incident At least two more 
variables must be taken into consideration before we draw a conclusion on how 
powerful the journalists，personal perceptions are in crises framing. 
One possible variable is the sMc of the crisis. It seemed natural 
that in a small crisis, it is easier for news organizations to maintain the routine 
control on their staff than in a big one. On the other hand, the involvement of 
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journalists in a small crisis would not be veiy high. It is supposed, therefore, that 
the bi昨er The scale of a crisis the more innpnrtant the jni.m.lktc p州⑶？^ 
interest will be in n^ws framing 
The other variable to be considered is crisis types with respect to 
the interests of different news organizations-There are certain types of crisis in 
which the news organizations interests are not challenged. Tlie interests of the 
rightist Hong Kong Times, for example, were clear and strong in the Tiananmen 
Square crisis. Although we found that the Times also depended very 函cli on its 
reporters to define the situation, its control on the staff was not so much 
weakened as it was in the leftist press and the commercial press. 
The Times' example may not be very illustrative as, in this case, its 
organizational interests happened to be in line with the personal interests of its 
journalists. What if they are different? Perhaps we can imagine a war between 
the KMT and the Communist. In such a case, both the leftist and the rightist 
newspapers are expected to tighten up its control on the staff so that the situation 
will be interpreted favourably to its own side. The journalists' personal 
inclinations，should they be different from the interests of their organizations, will 
be suppressed. The journalists have either to conform to the organizational 
pressure or to resign. 
It does not mean, however, that the crisis mode of news framing do 
not have any effect. We still expect that it works in commercial newspapers, 
where the organizational interests in this matter is not so clear and strong. In 
other words, whether news organizations have a strong and clear interest in a 
crisis also determined the degree to with the journalists' personal interests can 
affect news framing. It is supposed that the more ”Twrtain the nP.w. 
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glganka l imi^ interests are in . rW^c, ti . . ^ ^ r - lil,elv thnt the p.rcnn.i 
jadinatioiis of the journalists wonlri become the, mnjor factor in 二 
1L3 Power Structure and Shifts of Journalistic Paradigms 
A number of studies have suggested that the mass media, either 
deliberately or unconsciously, usually support the dominant ideology and the 
existing power structure (e.g. Paletz et al. 1971; Tuchman 1978; Molotch et al. 
1975; Chan 1987). Todd Gitlin (1980) argues that complete shifts in news frames 
was possible only when there were conflicts among power elites. 
The findings of this study supported these notions. It is found that 
the Hong Kong press took an obvious anti-Beijing stand only when there were 
serious crises within the power structure of the Communist regime. During the 
peak of the student movement, General Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang and 
Premier Li Peng was fighting vigorously in a power struggle against each other. 
It was widely conceived that Zhao was supporting the students while Li advocated 
a tough stand. The conflict within the central leadership of the Communist Party 
induced the Hong Kong newspapers to opt for their own interpretation of the 
movement. 
One interesting question to ask is whether the Hong Kong press 
would have acted the same way if there had been no vacuum in the Chinese 
leadership throughout the whole movement. Would the press still have taken such 
a firm anti-Beijing stand from mid May to June if they already knew that Li Peng 
was backed by Deng Xiaoping throughout the whole event? Tne answer is hard 
to find. What we know for sure, however, is that Deng Xiaoping's open support 
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for the massacre in early June was an important factor conducive to the 
"normalization" of both the leftist press and the commercial press. Deng's 
appearance was widely interpreted as an the end of the political conflict within 
the Chinese leadership. Obviously, it was not in the interests of Hong Kong 
newspapers to be hostile to a stable regime that is going to run Hong Kong after 
1997. 
11.4 Implications on the Future of The Hong Kong Press 
Exceptions prove the rule. One of the interesting findings of this 
study is that, even after such a great shock like the Tiananmen Square massacre, 
the newspapers find no trouble in reverting to their old way of framing news in 
a very short time. Tliis suggests that, as pointed out by Bennett et al. (1985), news 
paradigms do not shift easily. It also indicates how powerful the China factor is 
in shaping the journalistic paradigms of the Hong Kong Press. 
Chan (1987) concludes that Hong Kong's newspapers had gradually 
shifted its journalistic paradigms in a direction favourable towards China since 
the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong in 
1984. He also points out that the Hong Kong press's cooperative attitude towards 
the Chinese government will change only if China should damage the interest of 
Hong Kong, but the "regression" may be temporary and small-scale if the "one 
country two system" commitment still holds. This study seemed to support this 
prediction. 
The interest of the commercial newspapers, the backbone of the 
Hong Kong press, lies in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Hie 
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Tiananmen Square massacre was no doubt completely unacceptable to the people 
of Hong Kong. Yet, the Chinese government was quick to reiterate its 
commitment to Hong Kong.� The Chinese leadership, on the other hand, is 
stable. Under these circumstances, the commercial press was not prepared to be 
an long-term adversary of the Chinese government. 
However, the behaviour of the Hong Kong press during the 
Tiananmen Square incident must have alarmed the Beijing authorities. It has 
already tightened up its control over the leftist press. The activities of Hong Kong 
reporters in China are also severely restricted. After 1997，the control of the 
press is expected to be more rigid. The premise of this pessimistic projection is, 
of course, that the present PRC government lasts beyond 1997. 
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